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SELLING CHEVRON
CHRISTINE KEXEL CHABOT*

Over thirty years ago, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court orderedjudges to defer to administrative
agencies' reasonable interpretationsof ambiguous statutes. Chevron's deference doctrine
has since proved to be a resoundingfailure. he Supreme Court has applied Chevron in
a highly unpredictable manner, failing to offer agencies and lower courts adequate
guidance.
In response, this Article compares interpretive problems arsing under Chevron to
similar problems arising under contract law. Both areas have drawn competing
interpretive methodologies and disagreement over how much weiht courts should place on
written terms. In contract law, however, interpretive methodology may be understood to
vary according to parties' incentives to commit specfic contractual terms to writing. his
Article concludes that contract law's semi-tailoredcompromise approachhas the potential
to make Chevron more predictable.
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INTRODUCTION

Over thirty years ago, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,' the Supreme Court ordered judges to defer to administrative
agencies' reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutes. 2 Despite its
revered status as the "most cited case" in "any legal field," 3 Chevron is
growing as notorious as it is famous. Prominent scholars have recently
acknowledged that the Court routinely ignores Chevron deference 4 and have

1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id.
3. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out ofNothing at All: The Orgins ofthe
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
4. The Supreme Court has applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. atural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. in under 20 percent of cases in which it reviewed an agency's interpretation of a
statutc. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Laurcn E. Bacr, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment ofAgency Statutory Inteipretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. LJ. 1083,
1099 tbl. 1 (2008) [hcrcinafter Eskridge & Bacr, The Continuum ofDeference]; Connor N. Raso
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What
Motivates Justices in Agencj Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1762 tbl.4 (2010)
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called for its elimination5 or burial.
In Chevron, deference to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
offered a solution for Justices reviewing the agency's interpretation of a
complex regulatory statute.i Recently, however, deference failed to attract
a single Justice in King v. Burwell8 -the landmark Affordable Care Act case
in which the Court affirmed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS's)
interpretation of the Act's complex tax credit provisions.() Indeed, since the
Court decided Chevron, it has applied its deference framework inconsistently.
Many times, the Court has failed to obey agency interpretations of
seemingly ambiguous statutes. 0
This Article examines problems with
Chevron's interpretive framework and compares them to analogous
interpretive problems arising under contract law.
Under the Chevron framework, deference to an agency's interpretation
hinges on a judicial determination that the statute under review is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the issue decided by the agency. 1 According to
Step One of Chevron's iconic test, "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter." 12 If, however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue," a court moves to Step Two and defers to
the agency's construction so long as it is "permissible."" 3
Even if one sets aside the additional array of complications introduced
by deciding when Chevron should apply, its two-step framework confounds

[hcrcinafter Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon].
5. See Jack M. Bccrmann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failedand Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (2010).
6. See Lawson & Kam, supra note 3, at 5 (articulating their thesis by stating "we come
not to praisc (or criticizc) Chevron . . but to bury it").
7. Justice Stccns, who authored the opinion in Chevron, expressed in confcrcnce the
need to defer in the face of a complex regulatory problem, "When I am so confused, I go
with the agency." Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, Library of Congress, Madison Building,
Box 397, Folder 7.
8. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
9. Id. In Mich(gan v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgencg (EPA),Justice Thomas's concurrence
argued that Chevron facilitates agencies' unconstitutional cxcrcise of legislative power. 135 S.
Ct. 2699, 2714 (2015) (ThomasJ., concurring) (urging the Court to "stop to consider" the
Constitution before "blithcly giving the force of law" to agencies' statutory interpretations).
10. See infra Part I.B (critiquing Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014)); see alo infra Part III.A (critiquing MCI Telecommunications Cop. (MCI) v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T), 512 U.S. 218 (1994) and Food & DrugAdministration (FDA)
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cop., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
11. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 843.
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courts. 1 4 Empirical studies show that the Supreme Court has applied
Chevron inconsistently and in a surprisingly small percentage of cases. 15 As a
result, the Court has failed to develop a deference doctrine that provides
adequate guidance to lower courts. The Court's recent decisions in City of
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC),165 Utility Air Regulatoy
Group v. EPA,1 and King v. Burwell18 do not resolve Chevron's problems and
seem likely to make them worse.1
Judges applying Chevron's framework have struggled with two
fundamental shortcomings.
First, Step One hinges on an artificial
dichotomy between clarity and ambiguity. Judges' typical interpretive role
requires them to eliminate (or deny the existence of) statutory ambiguity.
Under Chevron, then, judges have sometimes constructed clear meaning
from very general statutory terms2() and acted as though they were applying
de novo review rather than a doctrine of deference.21 Chevron's deference
doctrine does not meaningfully distinguish statutes that specify particular
policy choices from statutes that leave room for a range of policy choices.
This failure is especially problematic since many regulatory statutes contain
22
generally-worded mandates.
Chevron's second shortcoming is that it implicates a broader, contentious
dispute over the proper methodology for assigming meaning to a statute.23
Some judges follow a rigid textualist approach, which focuses their inquiry
on statutory text and text-based sources of meaning.24 Other judges follow

14. Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 817-22 (noting complications under Step One and in
dctermining when Chevron applics). For the seminal work on dctermining when Chevron
applics, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chcvron¾ Domain, 89 GEO. LJ. 833
(2001).
15. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make RegulatoU Policy? An Empirical
Invetigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 825, 832 tbl.1 (2006); Eskridge & Bacr, The
Continuum ofDeference, supra note 4; Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4.
16. 133 S. Ct 1863 (2013).
17. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
18. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part II.A (critiquing MCiv. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Cop., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000)).
21. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermculc, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE. LJ.
676, 690-91 (2007); Lisa Schultz Brcssman, Chcvron'Mistake, 58 DUKE LJ. 549 (2009).
22. See infra Part II.A (providing examples of gcncrally-worded regulatory statutes).
23. Abbc R. Gluck, What 30 Yeas of Chevron Teach US About the Rest of StatutoU
Inteipretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 607, 619 (2014) (finding "the Court cannot agrcc" on
"traditional tools of construction" used to dcterminc ambiguity or clarity under Chevron).
24. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 235-36 (2d cd. 2006) [hcrcinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL.] ("Textualism holds
that the only object of statutory interpretation is to dctermine the meaning of the text and
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a purposive approach, which considers text alongside additional indicia of
legislative intent, such as legislative history and purpose.25 This divide
prompts judges to find more reasons to disagree than to agree when
deciding whether a statute has clear meaning under Chevron.2t As a result,
judges have not developed a Chevron test that adequately distinguishes
specific statutory terms from terms "phrased so broadly as to invite agency
interpretation." 27
This Article does not attempt to cite the thousands of law review articles
addressing Chevron or take on broader debates about theoretical
justifications for Chevron deference.28 For Chevron's proponents, as well as
judges, agencies, and interested parties who must operate under the current
legal regime, however, existing critiques of the Chevron framework offer only
partial responses to its flaws. Leading critiques make clear that some
scholars have focused on revising Chevron's two-step framework,2 9 while
other scholars have focused on revising the interpretive method judges
apply under Chevron.' Still other scholars give up on Chevron deference

that the only lcgitimate sources for this inquiry are text-based or -linked sources.").
25. Id. at 229 (asserting that purposivism "sets the originalist inquiry at a higher lcycl of
gcncrality" aimed at the "statutc's goal"). This Article follows Jonathan Molot's icad and
uses "purposivism as shorthand to refer to textualism's nonadherents or adversarics."
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM L. REV. 1, 3 n.2 (2006).
26. See Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 817-22 (noting different interpretive methods
applied under Step Onc).
27. Hon. Stephen Brcycr, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370-71 (1986).
28. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Inteipretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (cxpressing separation of powers concerns); see also
EvanJ. Criddc, Chcvron¾ Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1284-91 (2008) (summarizing
critiques of implied dclcgation, expertisc, and political accountability rationales).
29. See generally Brcssman, supra note 21, at 549 (arguing that Step One should bc recast
as a scarch for intent to dccgatc); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermculc, Chevron
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597-602 (2009) (proposing a single-step "rcasonablc"
interpretation test may placc judges in a more deferential mindset); Gersen & Vermculc,
supra note 21, at 709 (substituting a doctrinal rule for an institutional voting rule in which "a
supermajority of a multi-mcmber judicial panel would bc necessary to overturn agency
interpretations of law"); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Inteipretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 187 (1992) (arguing that under Chevron Step
Onc, courts should distinguish between agency interpretation of what Congress meant,
which is not entitled to deference, and agency lcgislation, which is entitled to deferencc);
Mark Scidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Ageng
Inteipretations of Statute, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 125-38 (1994) (proposing a "syncopated
Chevron" pursuant to which courts grant agencies more lecway at Step One while
cmphasizing reasoned decision making at Step Two).
30. See Sidncy A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1051, 1074-75 (1995) (proposing
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altogether 31 or bypass its two-step analysis in favor of other indicia of
Congress's intent to delegate. 3 2
In contrast, this Article turns to analogous interpretive problems in
contract law.
Scholars have widely recognized similarities between
statutory interpretation and contractual interpretation.33 In contract law,
courts apply the parol evidence rule when deciding whether a written
agreement has a gap, which allows the writing to be supplemented with
terms or meaning based on the parties' earlier negotiations or dealings.34
Similarly, in administrative law, courts must decide whether Congress has
"left a gap for the agency to fill" with specific policy decisions.35 Both of
these interpretive problems
have drawn
competing interpretive
methodologies and disagreement over how much weight courts should
place on written terms. 3t
In contract law, some courts have responded to disagreement by
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) amendments to specify "standards for reliance on
statutory text, legislative history, and tools of statutory construction"); ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

227 (2006) (advocating a "modest" plain meaning approach, in which "the agency prevails
unlcss the particular provision at hand clearly bars the regulation, without consideration of
legislative history").
31. See Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 782.
32. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 920; David J. Barron & Hon. Elcna
Kagan, Chcvron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201. This Article's critique of
Chevron is meant to complement, rather than supersedc, inquirics related to the scopc of
Chevron's domain.
33. "Many rules of contract interpretation are similar . . to the rules of statutory
interpretation." Abbc R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of StatutoU Inteipretation: Eric for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 793 (2013); accord Danicl A. Farber, Legislative
Deals and StatutoU Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV. 667, 667-68 (1991); McNollgast, Positive Canons:
The Role of Legislative Bargains in StatutoU Inteipretation, 80 GEO. LJ. 705, 715 (1992).
"McNollgast" is the name used by the three co-authors-Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G.
Noll and Barry R. Weingast-of the latter article and a scrics of related articles.
34. See Eric A. Posncr, The Parol Evidence Rule, the PlainMeaning Rule, and the Principles of
ContractualInteipretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533-34 (1997); see also discussion infra Part
III.
35. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (rcasoning that ambiguous statutes may lcave quite large gaps).
36. Posncr, supra note 34, at 573 ("The use of extrinsic evidence to interpret written
contracts is analogous to the use of lcgislative history in statutory interpretation."); accord
John M. Brcen, Statutoy Inteipretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 263,
290-91 (2000); Stephen F. Ross & Danicl Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutoy Inteipretation, 87 GEO. LJ. 195, 198 (1998); Peter L.
Strauss, I hen the Judge is Not the Primay Official with Responsibility to Read: Ageng Inteipretationand
the Problem of Legiative Histog, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 348 (1990). For a description of
controversy surrounding use of extrinsic evidence, lcgislative history, and the plain meaning
approach in contract and administrative law, see infra Parts II, III.A.
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tailoring competing interpretive methodologies to different circumstances.
Rather than adopting an across-the-board interpretive approach, these
courts have placed varied levels of weight on written contractual terms.3
Sometimes they apply interpretive methods akin to textualism, and other
times they apply interpretive methods akin to purposivism.38
Courts'
application of these varied interpretive methodologies has not been reduced
to a simple verbal formulation or easily applied rule. Nevertheless, this
aspect of contractual interpretation can be understood in terms of parties'
differing incentives to commit specific contractual terms to writing.3
Regulatory statutes lend themselves to similar analysis. Congress's use of
specific statutory language in some instances, and general language in
others, can be understood to reflect Congress's differing incentives to
commit to specific policy choices in legislation. 40 One of Chevron's key flaws
is that its interpretive framework prompts judges to search for specific
meaning in all legislation.4 1 By incorporating a more tailored, contractual
approach, courts could improve Chevron's framework by accounting for
differences in legislative outcomes.
General statutory terms, such as
"modify," should not specify agency policy choices as readily as more
specific terms, such as those containing formulas for calculating percentiles
of a given population.42
An approach in which courts vary how much emphasis they place on
textual evidence also calls for greater interpretive compromise.
Here,
contract law again suggests areas of common ground for textualists and
purposivists. The Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC's or the Code's)
parole evidence rule offers opportunities for compromise by adding
structure to a purposive interpretive framework. The UCC prioritizes
textual evidence reflected in specific written terms,43 but it counsels against
embellishing textual evidence with meaning derived from dictionary
definitions and canons of construction.44
The UCC also provides a
hierarchy of non-textual evidence and suggests ways in which judges might
37. See Posncr, supra note 34, at 550, 554; see discussion infra Part III.
38. See infta Part III.
39. See Posncr, supra note 34, at 545.
40. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State, 89
GEO. LJ. 97, 135 (2000); see alo discussion infra Part II.A.
41. Brcssman, supra note 21, at 551.
42. See infra note 357.
43. U.C.C. § 1-303(c)(1) (2002) (stating "cxpress terms prevail" when they cannot be
construed consistently with evidence based on course of performance, course of dealing, or
trade usage).
44. Id. cmt. 1 (rejecting "lay-dictionary" reading of a commercial agreement); id.
§ 2-202 cmt. 1(b) (rejecting meaning derived from "rules of construction existing in the
law").
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distinguish reliable from unreliable evidence of Congress's intent.45 As
explained below, the UCC's framework could afford judges more reasons
to agree and allow for more consistent decisions when interpreting statutes
under Chevron.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes general struggles the
Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have faced when applying
Chevron, as well as recent Supreme Court decisions that further complicate
the Chevron framework. Part II relates Chevron's problems to fundamental
flaws in its interpretive framework. Part III views Chevron's interpretive
problems through the lens of contract law. It describes how contract law's
semi-tailored interpretive methodologies address problems similar to those
arising under Chevron. These facets of contractual interpretation offer
compelling alternatives to Chevron, even accounting for common objections
based on notice and judicial error. The Article concludes that Chevron's
flawed interpretive framework is not inevitable. Rather, a more tailored
interpretive approach is within reach.

I. CHEVRONVIS UNPREDICTABLE
A. Empirical Studies Show Judges Have Applied Chevron Inconsistently
Chevron deference lacks settled theoretical underpinnings.46
When
deciding Chevron, the Court did not consider the case to be a major change
in existing standards of review. 47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review EPA rules implementing amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA),
which required "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution
to meet stringent permit conditions.48 The EPA's rules limited the number
of firms subject to permit requirements by interpreting "source" using a
"plant-wide definition" or "bubble" concept.9 Justice Stevens's 6-0
opinion found that neither the text nor the legislative history showed that
the term "source" had a clear meaning, precluding the EPA's bubble
concept.50
The Chevron opinion and subsequent commentary advance numerous
45. Id. § 2-202, 1-303(c) (prioritizing course of performance, course of dealing, and
trade usage over evidence of carlicr or contemporancous verbal promises).
46. See Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 795-809 (maintaining Chevron lacks an "adcquate
thcorctical justification").
47. See Thomas N. Merrill, The Stoy of Chevron: he Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE Lxw STORIES 399, 402 (Peter L. Strauss cd. 2006).
48. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42,
849 n.23 (1984).
49. Id. at 856.
50. Id. at 851.

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

2015]

Do NoT DELETE

/2
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

SELLING CHEVRON

489

legal and pragmatic bases for deference to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute that it administers. Leading understandings emphasize
congressional intent,5 1 deference to the Executive Branch for its superior
expertise or for political accountability,5 2 judicial restraint,53 and ability to
minimize conflict between circuits.54 Chevron's multiple foundations have
not resulted in a consistently applied deference doctrine at the Supreme
Court or federal courts of appeals.55 The discussion below first outlines

5 1. Justice Stcycns asserted "legislative dclcgation to an agency on a particular question
is implicit rather than explicit." Id. at 844. Subsequent decisions and writings ground
Chevron deference in congressional intent to authorizc an agency to act with the force of law.
See, e.g., United States v. Mcad Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (basing force of law
dctermination on open-cnded factors including formality of procedures authorized and used
by agency); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 875-87 (finding agencies act with the force
of law when they issue self-cxecuting orders that are binding on third partics); John F. Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 199-203 (1998) (discussing
that agencies act with force of law when they promulgate legislative rules). Congressional
intent has gained scholarly consensus as a key basis for Chevron, but it has also been criticizcd
as an unsupportable fiction. See Mark Scidenfeld, Chcvron3 Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 273, 277 n.12, 278 (2011).
52. Justice Stcycns listed agencies' superior expertisc and political accountability as
reasons for deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66 (stating that compared to agencies,
"judges are not experts in the field" and have "no constituency" or accountability to the
Executive Branch); see also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Ageng Inteipretations of Ageng Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 626 (1996) (deference to more
accountable agency "makes sense of original constitutional commitments to clectoral
accountability"); Douglas W. Kmicc, JudicialDeference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. LJ. 269, 281 (1988) (cxplaining that Chevron both allows and
prompts "agencies to be responsive to the elected executive") (cmphasis in original); cf. Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive'k Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE LJ. 2580,
2587-88 (2006) (asserting that deference to the executive promotes technical expertisc,
accountability, flexibility, and prompt regulatory action).
53. Justice Stcycns noted that Chevron deference allows judges to avoid the challenge of
setting asidc "personal policy preferences" to reconcile competing policy interests. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Dcef Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). Mark Scidenfeld
argues that Chevron's foundation is judicial restraint from interfering with decisions of the
political branches under Article III. Scidenfeld, supra note 51, at 289.
54. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifiy Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court'3 Limited Resources for JudicialReview ofAgeng Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1111-12
(1987). Evan Criddlc advances a pluralist thcory in which Chevron draws support from
multiplc rationales discussed abovc. EvanJ. Criddlc, supra note 28, at 1325.
55. Inconsistency stems from problems in dctermining when Chevron applics and
disagreement over Step Onc. Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 817-22 (noting that courts have
struggled to dctermine when Chevron's framcwork applics and when to apply multiplc,
competing versions of the Step One test). A number of scholars have documented the lack
of a settled framcwork for identifying clear meaning at Step Onc. Lawson & Kam, supra
note 3, at 73 (noting lack of consensus on dcterminants of clear meaning at Step Onc); Linda
Jcllum, Chcvron' Demise: A Surve of Chevron fiom Infang to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
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empirical studies documenting inconsistencies in these courts' resolution of
cases under the Chevron framework. It then relates broader uncertainty
generated by the Supreme Court's widespread failure to apply Chevron (or
even the competing standard of review set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.)56
5
to review agency interpretations of statutes.
At the Supreme Court, Justices accord highly inconsistent levels of
deference when applying Chevron. Thomas Merrill's early analysis of the
Court's pre- and post-Chevron decisions raised important questions about
whether Chevron deference declined as textualism gained traction on the
Court.5 8 In a subsequent study, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein focused
on sixty-nine decisions, issued from 1989-2005, in which the Supreme
Court applied the Chevron framework to review agency interpretations of
law.() Analyzing votes by individual Justices, they found that some Justices
voted to validate far more agency opinions than others and that most
Justices significantly favored either liberal or conservative agency decisions.
Justices Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens had validation rates in the
70-80 percent range.io Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, validated
agency decisions just over half of the time. 1
Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's staunch textualist approach offers
one explanation for their low validation rates. Justice Scalia argues that
textualists exhibit judicial restraint when they identify clear meaning in
Chevron analysis: "One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a
statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the [ambiguity] required for Chevron deference

725, 730-37, 760 (2007) (describing inconsistency applying Step One at both the court of
appeals and Supreme Court lcycls); Mclina Fortc, Mai Legislative History Be Considered at
Chevron Step One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Gciscr, 54
VILL. L. REV. 727, 729 (2009) (analyzing conflict in courts of appeals over use of lcgislative
history at Step Onc); Barry Sullivan, On the Borderland of Chcvron's Empire: An Esay on Title
VII, Agencj Procedurs and Priorities, and the Power of udicial Review, 62 L. L. REV. 317, 407-29
(2002) (describing courts of appeals' inconsistent approaches to reviewing the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) carly right to sue letters under Chevron).

56.

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
58. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q 351, 355 tbl.1, 359 tbl.2 (1994) (finding inversc relationship between ascendency of
textualism and Chevron deferencc).
59. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 825, 832 tbl.l.
60. Id. at 832 tbl.l (finding their respective validation rates were .818, .770, .740, and
.710).
61. Justice Scalia's validation rate was .522 and Justice Thomas's rate was .536. Id.
Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor hovered abovc at affirmance rates in the 60
percent range. Id.
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exists."6 2 A purposivist judge who is open to legislative history and other
sources of statutory meaning, however, "will more frequently find agencyliberating ambiguity." 3 But judicial restraint is hardly the only conclusion
to be drawn from textualism. Textualism may instead spur judges to
creatively construct meanings that contradict agencies' policy choices.64
A stronger theme is that both textualism and purposivism allow
significant judicial discretion. 5
Indeed, Justice Scalia's and Justice
Thomas's low validation rates can also be explained in terms of their
conservative political preferences-a majority of the agency decisions on
review were liberal.t 6 Any attempt to attribute such a result only to
formalist, textual commitments is refuted by an additional fact-Justice
Thomas's and Justice Scalia's rates of validation are uneven. They both
voted to validate conservative agency decisions at significantly higher rates
than liberal agency decisions.67 The converse is true for Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Ginsburg,t 8 even though Justice Breyer claims that his
purposive interpretative approach and use of legislative history "can
promote interpretations that more closely correspond" to lawmakers'
expectations.' This evidence suggests that one cannot expect a single
interpretive method to even out validation rates for liberal and conservative
agency decisions.
Concerns over consistency should not be swept aside based on an

62. Hon. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Inteipretation of Law, 1989
DUKE LJ. 511, 521 (1989) (cmphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. See Merrill, supra note 58, at 372 ("In effect, the textualist interpreter does notfind
the meaning of the statute so much as construct the meaning.") (cmphasis in original); Richard
J. Picrce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hpertextualism:An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995) ("[Thc] majority ofJustices have
now begun to use textualist methods of construction that routincly allow them to attribute
'plain meaning' to statutory language that most obscrvers would characterizc as ambiguous
or internally inconsistent.").
65. See Picrce, supra note 64, at 778 (concluding that "judges have sometimes abused
lcgislative history," but an "cxtreme version of textualism" also allows "disingenuous, resultoriented interpretation").
66. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 825-26. For examplc,Justice Brcycr considered
thirty liberal agency decisions and fourteen conservative decisions, while Justice Scalia
considered forty-thrcc liberal decisions and twenty-six conservative decisions. Id. at 832
tbl.1.
67. Id. ChicfJustice Rehnquist exhibited the same pattern. The validation rates for
Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy were not noticcably different for liberal and
conservative agency outcomes. Id.
68. Id.
69. Hon. Stephen Brcycr, On the USes of Legislative History in InteipretingStatute, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 845, 861 (1992).
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understanding that on average agencies receive adequate levels of deference
on judicial review.o As noted above, an individual case could draw a wide
range of deference outcomes, depending on whether the conservative or
liberal wing of the Court prevails. Justice Kennedy, a well-known swing
vote, validated liberal agency decisions at almost the same rate as he
validated conservative ones,7 1 suggesting he sided with the Court's liberal
wing about as much as he sides with its conservative wing. Thus, it appears
difficult to predict which side will win five votes in any given case decided
under Chevron.
Unpredictable application of Chevron is not limited to the Supreme
Court.S Outcomes may still vary a great deal from one panel to another in

the federal courts of appeals. For example, when Frank Cross and
Emerson Tiller considered 170 cases in which the D.C. Circuit applied
Chevron, they identified significant correlations between ideologies of panel
members and decisions to grant deference. 3 Judges were more likely to
defer when the agency policy choice aligned with predicted ideological
preferences of a majority of the panel.74 When the agency's policy choice
ran contrary to a majority of the panel's policy preferences, however,
ideologically divided panels deferred and voted contrary to their political
preferences far more than ideologically unified panels.75 Cross and Tiller

&

70. See Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4, at 1805 (stating that they arc
"unpersuaded" that the Court "is not deferential enough").
71. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 832 tbl. 1 (showingJustice Kennedy validated
66.7 percent of liberal decisions and 68.0 percent of conservative decisions for an
insignificant 1.3 percent difference in voting with cither sidc).
72. See RichardJ. Picrce,Jr., Wh at Do the Studies ofjudicial Review ofAgencj Actions Mean?,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 89 (2011) [hcrcinafter Picrce, Studies ofJudicial Review] ("Every study
of circuit court decisions that has looked at the question has found that idcological
preferences hclp to explain patterns of decisions in cases in which courts review agency
actions."); see also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshi and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: JWhistleblowing on the Federal Courts ofAppeal, 107 YALE LJ. 2155, 2171-72
tbl.3 (1998) [hcrcinafter Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship];Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study ofthe Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 15 YALEJ. ON
REG. 1, 40 (1998); Richard L. Rcycsz, EnvironmentalRegulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718-19 (1997). Studics reach mixed results as to whether deference
rates in the courts of appeals increased after Chevron. See Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship,
supra, note 72, at 2167 (1998) (noting that studics by Schuck and Elliott and Cohen and
Spitzcr find increased deference, whercas a study by Shapiro and Levy finds decreased
deferencc). In any cycnt, fluctuation in rates of deference may reflect a response to more
aggressive agency interpretations rather than changes in judicial deference. Sunstein, supra
note 52, at 2600 n.96. Finally, Chevron decisions in the district courts have not been studied
in as much dctail as other courts. See Picrce, Studies ofJudicial Review, supra note 72, at 84.
73. Cross & Tiller,JudicialPartisanship,supra note 72, at 2168, 2171-72.
74. Id. at 2171.
75. Id. at 2172-73 & fig.2. Unified panels have a 3-0 ratio of republican to democratic
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postulated that the divided panel's minority judge may have had a
whistleblower effect, deterring the judge's colleagues from ignoring Chevron
deference.76
Other studies considering all circuits also conclude that
deference decisions vary according to judicial ideology.7
Beyond inconsistent grants of deference by courts, confusion also stems
from the fact that the Supreme Court applies Chevron in a surprisingly small
percentage of cases. Chevron deference does not apply every time an agency
interprets general statutory language.7 8 The Court's decisions about when
to apply the Chevron framework have been dubbed Chevron "Step Zero."'1
Despite its added complexity, Step Zero removes pressure from the
underlying Chevron framework.8 (o This step has allowed contextual analysis
that may better approximate Congress's intent to delegate a policy decision
to an agency than Chevron's clarity versus ambiguity test.8 1
Step Zero analysis tends to focus on two factors: "whether Congress
delegated to the agency power to act with the force of law;" and whether
the agency exercised "such authority in adopting the interpretation at
issue." 8 2 In circumstances where Step Zero analysis counsels against
Chevron, courts apply an intermediate form of deference, known as Skidmore

appointees or vice versa, whercas split panels have a 2-1 ratio of democratic to republican
appointees or vice versa. Id.
76. Id. at 2174.
77. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 852 (considering opinions published in
1990-2004 in which the circuits reviewed statutory interpretations issued by the EPA,
National Labor Relations Board, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and
finding that "both Democratic and Republican appointcs show far more political voting
patterns when they arc sitting on unified pancis"); Kerr, supra note 72, at 40-41 & chart 9
(considering decisions from all circuits and identifying significant differences in Republican
and Democratic appointces' acceptance rates in politically salient cases). Although many
studics attempting to measure enhanced court of appeals' deference under Chevron do not
control for changes in agency interpretations, one study considering different judicial
approaches to the same agency interpretation found varied rates ofjudicial deference under
Chevron. Sullivan, supra note 55, at 407-29 (discussing courts' application of varying degrees
of deference to EEOC's allowance for carly right to sue letters after Chevron).
78. United States v. Mcad Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
79. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 912; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero,
92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
80. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 858, 912-13.
81. Id. An ambiguous statute does not grant administrators unchecked interpretive
authority, for examplc, over issues which are far removed from their expertisc and decided
without the benefit of transparent procedure. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268
(2006) (denying Chevron deference to Attorncy Gencral John Ashcroft's unilateral
interpretation of "legitimate medical practicc" in the assisted suicide context).
82. Kristen E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mcad, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537
(2014) (discussing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27).
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deference.8 3 Under Skidmore deference, courts are to give weight but not
obedience to an agency's interpretation of a regulatory statute.84
When considering the larger group of cases reviewing agency
interpretations of statutes, however, decisions become even less predictable.
This point is well made by empirical studies undertaken by William
Eskridge and co-authors in separate studies, Lauren Baer and Connor
Raso. These studies reveal that the Supreme Court applies the Chevron
framework in a surprisingly small percentage of cases. The most recent
study, by Eskridge and Raso, focuses on the application of Chevron and
competing administrative law deference regimes in 667 Supreme Court
cases involving agency interpretations of statutes.85
Within this sample, the subset of cases in which the Court applied the
Chevron framework was surprisingly small; Justices voted to apply Chevron in
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions at an average of under 20
percent. t By contrast, the Justices voted to apply no deference or an antideference regime at an average of almost 50 percent.87 For remaining
opinions, most Justices voted to apply Skidmore or a similar type of
consultative deference, and a final sliver voted to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations.88 These findings reflect inconsistency
and lack of predictability in the Court's review of agency interpretations of
statutes. 8
Adding to Chevron's unpredictability, empirical studies offer mixed results
as to whether the use of Chevron is correlated with higher agency win rates.')o)
As a result, litigants cannot tell whether Chevron is likely to bolster their

&

83. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
84. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
85. Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4, at 1741.
86. Id. at 1762 tbl.4 (considering Chevron with a similar Beth Israel doctrinc). Eskridge
and Bacr identify an cycn smaller percentage of majority and plurality opinions applying
Chevron (8.3 percent) in an expanded dataset. Eskridge & Bacr, The Continuum of Deference,
supra note 4.
87. Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4, at 1762 tbl.4.
88. Id. (notingJustices voted to apply Skidmore/consultative deference in 28.38 percent
of all opinions and to defer to agency interpretations of their own rules in 2.66 percent of all
opinions).
89. Id. at 1817 (concluding that "the Justices apply deference doctrinc inconsistently");
accord Eskridge & Bacr, The Continuum ofDeference, supra note 4, at 1098.
90. Compare Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4, at 1767 tbl.6 (finding
decisions applying the Chevron framcwork had a higher agency win rate (72.13 percent)
compared to the win rate in no or anti-deference cases (60.76 percent)), with Miles
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 849 (noting decisions applying the Chevron framcwork had only a
67 percent win ratc). See generaly Picrce, Studies of Judicial Review, supra note 72, at 85
(concluding that "doctrinally-based differences in outcome are barely dctcctablc" for all
courts).
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chances of winning a case. Further, the Court's broad failure to use any
deference regime in almost half of its cases raises concerns about a lack of
announced standards for deference. These decisions do not support an
understanding that the Court has used Step Zero to incorporate predictable
contextual factors that tailor Chevron deference. Moreover, litigants may not
know how an agency's sudden change of interpretation, which is generally
accommodated under Chevron but not under Skidmore,')' will fare if the Court
instead grants no deference. This lack of clear guidance to agencies, other
interested parties, and lower courts9 2 is especially problematic in light of
Cross and Tiller's findings that appellate judges are more inclined to set
aside their ideological leanings and defer to the agency's interpretation
3
when they sit on split panels.")
The Supreme Court's incoherent decisions
do not give a minority panel member meaningful parameters to insist that
her colleagues follow.
There are a variety of possible reasons why Justices (including Justice
Scalia) have chosen to spurn Chevron in over 80 percent of all opinions and
Chevron and Skidmore in almost 50 percent of all opinions. Justices may wish
to avoid the Chevron/Skidmore framework because of the complication and
political controversy generated by both Step Zero and Chevron deference.9"
Ignoring Chevron is also consistent with the understanding that it is a highly
malleable legal doctrine and is sometimes difficult to distinguish from de
novo review.95 As Thomas Merrill explains, Chevron has been "applied in
an accordion-like fashion," so that judges manipulate its inquiries to find
that "clear" means different things in different cases.""
Further, Eskridge's studies with Baer and Raso suggest Chevron does not
appeal to many Justices' desire to "tailor deference to variety" when
91. Compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863 (1984) (stating agencies' initial interpretations arc "not instantly carved in stonc"), with
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (cxplaining the Court gives weight to
agency interpretations depending on, inter alia, their "consistency with carlicr and later
pronouncements").
92. Picrce, supra note 64, at 752.
93. See Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partianship, supra note 72, at 2161. What is more, the
doctrinc's lack of predictability may drive away courts that have a choice whether to adopt
Chevron. When the Michigan Supreme Court was asked to formally adopt Chevron in 2008,
for examplc, it declined to do so. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that Chevron's
framcwork had proved "very difficult to apply" and did "not provide a clear road map" for
state courts to follow. In re Complaint ofRovas Against SBCMichigan, 754 N.W.2d 259, 271-72
(Mich. 2008).
94. See Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 817-22 (noting confusion caused by both Step Zcro
and Step One of Chevron).
95. See discussion infra Part II.A.
96. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753,
783 (2014).
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reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. The overwhelming conclusion
to be drawn from both studies is that Justices desire to review these
questions using multiple deference frameworks.9 There is no evidence the
Court has ever followed the bright-line "Chevron-or-nothing approach")8
urged byJustice Scalia.')')
Given the Justices' strong revealed preferences for tailoring at Step Zero,
it is possible they also favor deference doctrines that can be tailored to
reflect variations in facts of a given case. The Chevron framework is woefully
lacking on this count. Under Skidmore, for example, a judge may adjust the
amount of weight she gives an agency interpretation according to certain
non-textual cues, such as the thoroughness of the agency's reasoning or
longstanding nature of an agency's interpretation."o
In contrast,
traditional application of Chevron omits these factors.'()' Instead, it focuses
on textual cues of clarity versus ambiguity, which are highly abstract and
untailored.
While Chevron's clarity versus ambiguity cues are themselves too abstract
to be helpful,o 2 one might imagine an appellate court refining this inquiry.
Chevron itself directs courts to employ "traditional tools of statutory
construction" to ascertain whether "Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue." 1 " Courts applying these tools could develop
factors to help identify how clear is clear as they separate statutes that leave
policy space for the agency from those that limit agencies to specific policy
choices. For example, then-Judge Stephen Breyer noted that a court might
be inclined to defer when the language is "inherently imprecise" or the
"words of the statute are phrased so broadly as to invite agency
interpretation." 10 4
Developing analysis of textual cues, however, adds another serious
complication:
it implicates
a sharp
dispute
over
interpretive

97. Eskridge and Bacr conclude the Court applics a continuum of deference, and
Eskridge and Raso find that Chevron is treated as an interpretive canon rather than a binding
precedent. See generally Eskridge & Bacr, The Continuum of Deference, supra note 4, at 1083;
Raso & Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, supra note 4, at 1727.
98. Eskridge & Bacr, The Continuum ofDeference, supra note 4, at 1098.
99. United States v. Mcad Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 260-61 (2001) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
100. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
101. Cf City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875-76 (2013) (Brcycr, J.,
concurring) (blending Skidmore and Chevron analyscs).
102. Gersen & Vermculc, supra note 21, at 695 (cxplaining "clarity" is a conceptually
difficult categorical judgment); Brcycr, supra note 27, at 373 (arguing that a "single simplc
verbal formula" is unlikely to capture all deference concerns).
103. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
104. Brcycr, supra note 27, at 370-71.
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methodology.1 0 5 This dispute makes it difficult to agree on indicia of clear
meaning.0 t3 Rather than clarifying the law, Step One's test for determining
clear meaning has complicated it."" Conflicting views on interpretive
methodology make it difficult for judges to develop consensus on textual
cues that might show clarity or ambiguity over a larger range of cases.
These concerns have manifested themselves in a Chevron framework that is
applied inconsistently and infrequently. As explained below, the Court's
recent decisions portend to make things worse.
B. The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions Generate FurtherConfusion over Chevron
The Supreme Court's recent rulings in City ofArlington v. FCC, Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, and King v. Burwell will likely exacerbate inconsistent
application of Chevron. City ofArlington and King adopt seemingly inconsistent
Step Zero tests for determining when Chevron applies. In City ofArlington, the
Court held that Chevron deference applies to an agency's expansion of its
own jurisdiction and refused to recognize an exception for extraordinary
decisions amounting to controversial grabs of power.1 0o8 In King, however, a
different majority of the Court granted no deference (Chevron or otherwise)
to the IRS's rules awarding tax credits under the Affordable Care Act.'') It
found Chevron inapplicable to this extraordinary question of "deep
'economic and political significance."' 110
Courts are unlikely to resolve the further uncertainty generated by City of
Arlington and King in a manner that promotes deference to agencies. King
directs judges confronted with extraordinary questions to resolve statutory
ambiguity and determine meaning independently. Further, the Chevron test
itself failed to afford deference in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.111
There, five Justices agreed that highly politically and economically
significant EPA regulations were impermissible under Chevron because they
were not clearly authorized by Congress. 112 Utility Air stands Chevron on its
head and invites courts to withhold deference when reviewing significant
agency regulations.

105. Gluck, supra note 23, at 619 ("The Court cannot agree on what the traditional tools
of construction arc .... ).
106. For examplc, should judges give more weight to dictionary definitions or legislative
history? See Merrill, supra note 58, at 354-62.
107. Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 822.
108. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868-72 (2013).
109. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
110. Id.
111. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014).
112. Id. at 2444 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60

(2000)).
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The discussion below first provides background on the relationship
between Chevron and exceptions for extraordinary cases and expansions of
agency jurisdiction. It then describes questions raised by the Court's recent
treatments of these issues in City ofArlington, King, and Utility Air.
1. An Exceptionfor Agencies' Expansion ofjurisdiction in Extraordinary Cases?
Scholars have long questioned whether Step Zero precludes Chevron
deference for controversial cases involving "extraordinary" questions and
an agency's expansion of jurisdiction. 1 3, Before City of Arlington, decisions
such as Federal Drug Administration (FDA) v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp." 4 arguably created leeway to exclude such extraordinary cases from
the standard Chevron framework. 115 In Brown & Williamson, the FDA
dramatically expanded its jurisdiction by attempting to regulate tobacco
products. The agency interpreted the jurisdictional provisions of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to permit the regulation of sales of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products to adolescents and minors.1(6
While tobacco products seemed to fall under the FDA's broad authority to
regulate "drugs" and "drug delivery devices," the tobacco industry
contested the regulations. 117 The industry objected to Chevron deference for
agency interpretations "that implicate the scope of an agency's regulatory

jurisdiction."

18

The Court invalidated the FDA's rules without squarely addressing the
jurisdictional objection to Chevron deference. The majority applied Chevron
Step One and found the FDA's regulation of tobacco products contravened
Congress's clear intent."') In so doing, it looked past the FDCA's broad
definitions of drugs and devices and rested its decision on (1) policy
concerns that regulation would require tobacco products to be removed
from the market and (2) later-enacted statutes that had the effect of ratifying
the FDA's earlier refusal to exercise jurisdiction over tobacco. 120
At the same time, the Court suggested this might not be a typical Chevron
case.
It questioned whether the Chevron framework should imply a

113. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, smpra note 14, at 851.
114. 529 U.S. at 126
115. Id. at 159 (suggesting this case is unordinary and uniquc).
116. Id. at 126. ("The [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)] grants the FDA, as the
designce of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the authority to regulate,
among other items, 'drugs' and 'devices."'). See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h) (2012).
117. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 129-130.
118. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 844.
119. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 131-32 (2000).
120. Id. at 142-43, 156; Molot, supra note 25, at 67-68.
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delegation of authority based on "the nature of the question presented." 121
The Court deemed the FDA's regulation of tobacco products an
extraordinary question 122 and doubted that Congress would have delegated
"a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion."123 Thus, it was unclear whether the majority decision
rested solely on an aggressive application of Step One or whether the Court
was carving out an exception for the extraordinary issue presented by the
124
FDA's regulation of tobacco products.
An undifferentiated Chevron test may be problematic. As Merrill and
Hickman explained, broad use of Step One to police "agency deviations
from their assigned mandates" tends to "distort" the Step One inquiry.125
Reviewing judges will be tempted to "insist" on interpretations that are not
the only plausible interpretation of the statute, but then "dissemble" by
characterizing their preferred readings as resting on the statute's clear or
plain meaning. 126 In other words, judges may pay lip service to Chevron
while making an independent determination whether an agency may
expand or contract its jurisdiction. This aggressive manipulation of Chevron
undermines its fundamental interests in deference to agency decisions.127
Further, aggressive application of Chevron in controversial cases may weaken
its framework and reduce deference across all cases.
2. City of Arlington v. FCC and King v. Burwell Further Complicate Step ,ero
City ofArlington v. FCC resolved the jurisdictional issue left open in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. in favor of broad application of Step One.
In City of Arlington, the Court reviewed the FCC's decision to establish
timeframes in which local government authorities must act on siting
applications for wireless facilities. 128 Local authorities challenged the FCC's
Declaratory Ruling, arguing that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did

121.

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.

122. Id
123. Id. at 160.
124. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 911.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 911-12 & n.380 (citingMCe. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994)).
127. Id. at 911 (identifying "scrious drawbacks" to an undifferentiated approach where
cases like Brown & Williamson are decided at Step Onc). Even those who favor judicial
resolution of extraordinary issues argue it should be conducted under a more transparent
framcwork than Chevron. Merrill, supra note 96, at 783.
128. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867-71 (2013). This case focused on the Communications Act of
1934's (Communications Act's) provisions requiring local govcrnments to act on siting
applications for wirclcss facilitics "within a reasonable period of time."
47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012).

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

500

Do NoT DELETE

//
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

ADMIMSImTuIVEL4VREVwIE

[67:3

not grant the FCC jurisdiction to impose specific processing timeframes. 129
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia affirmed the FCC's ruling and held
the FCC was entitled to Chevron deference notwithstanding the jurisdictional
issue.o( Justice Scalia has long opined that across-the-board Chevron will
simplify deference doctrine."31 Here, a majority of the Court agreed with
Justice Scalia that it was impossible to distinguish jurisdictional from non3 2
Thus, Chevron was applied
jurisdictional questions in the agency context.1
33
across the board.1
City ofArlington's core holding focused on jurisdiction, not an exception
for extraordinary cases. Still, in ruling on the jurisdictional issue, Justice
Scalia refused to distinguish between "big, important" questions, which
might be considered jurisdictional issues for independent judicial
determination, and "humdrum, run-of-the mill" questions, which should be
accorded Chevron deference.134 Justice Scalia found "no principled basis for
carving out some arbitrary subset of such claims." 135 He went on to cite
Brown & Williamson as a case resolved using the traditional Chevron
framework. 1,3 Thus, City ofArlington suggests that Brown & Williamson falls
under Chevron's Step One framework.
ChiefJustice Roberts dissented. He disagreed that the argument against
deference turned on the difference between "big" and "humdrum" cases. 137
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that case turned on a different argument:
courts should not defer on the threshold question "whether Congress has
granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory ambiguity at
issue." 138 Unlike the majority, 3 () Chief Justice Roberts would not grant
deference simply because the FCC had authority to promulgate rules
pursuant to a general grant of rulemaking power. 140
The next term, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court
incorporated Brown & Williamson's extraordinary case standard into the

129.

City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1867.

130. Id. at 1871. Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg joined the
majority. Justice Brcycr wrote an opinion concurring in part, and Justices Kennedy and
Alitojoined the ChicfJusticc's dissent. Id. at 1865.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

United States v. Mead Coip., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1865 (2013).
Id. at 1871.
City ofArlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
Id. at 1869.
Id. at 1872.
Id. at 1879.
Id. at 1879-80.
Id. at 1874.
City ofArlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1883 (2013).
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Chevron framework. 141 Utility Air involved the EPA's expanded regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Under Chevron Step
Two, 142 five Justices held it "impermissible" for the EPA to adopt
extraordinary regulations of "vast 'economic and political significance"'.
without clear authorization from Congress.143 ChiefJustice Roberts joined
this opinion, thus appearing to agree that Brown & Williamson's
extraordinary case standard fell within the Chevron framework.1 4 4
In King v. Burwell, however, ChiefJustice Roberts did an about-face and
announced an extraordinary case exception to Chevron. King was part of a
series of highly controversial challenges to the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Several plaintiffs challenged IRS rules extending ACA's tax credits to
millions of individuals who purchased health insurance on federallyestablished marketplaces. 145 While the D.C. Circuit and Fourth Circuit
initially split over the legality of the IRS rules, 14 6 the judges analyzed the
IRS rules under Chevron. 14 1 The Supreme Court ultimately decided to
review the Fourth Circuit's decision, which granted Chevron deference on
the ground that IRS rules were a reasonable interpretation of an

ambiguous statute.

148

In their merits briefs, the parties' arguments focused primarily on
competing interpretations of the ACA. In addition to arguments about the
unambiguous meaning of the ACA, however, the petitioners offered three

141.

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)

142. Tom Merrill describes the Court's decision as falling under Chevron Step Two.
Merrill, supra note 96, at 756. Alternatively, the analysis could be characterizcd as collapsing
Chevron into a single step and asking whether the agency's interpretation is permissiblc. See
Stephenson & Vcrmculc, supra note 29, at 599.
143. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2443-45 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cop.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000).). Justice Scalia wrote an opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court. ChiefJustice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full, and Justices
Alito and Thomas joined the portion of the opinion finding the certain of the EPA's new
greenhouse gas cmission regulations impermissible under Chevron. Id. at 2432.
144. Id. at 2435-37.
145. King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
146. Compare Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding "section
36B unambiguously forecloscs" the IRS's interpretation under Chevron Step Onc), with King
v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Chevron deference to uphold the
IRS's permissible construction of an ambiguous statutc).
147. Halbg, 758 F.3d at 398-403; King, 759 F.3d at 363 (applying Chevron deference to
uphold IRS's permissible construction of an ambiguous statutc); id. at 376 (Davis, J.,
concurring) (concluding "at Chevron Step Onc," the "IRS's interpretation of the Act is
"correct" and "required as a matter of law"); cf. Oklahoma ex rel Pruitt v. Bunvell, 51 F.
Supp. 3d 1080, 1091 (E.D. Okla. 2014) (vacating the IRS's rule on the ground that "clear
and unambiguous languagc" is required to authorizc tax credits).
148. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
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reasons why Chevron could not save the IRS's rules: (1) this was an
extraordinary case under Utility Air and Brown & Williamson;14 ) (2) the "clear
statement" canon trumps deference to the IRS;150 and (3) the IRS does not
administer contested provisions of the ACA. 151
The government countered all of these points. 152 In particular, it noted
that an exception for extraordinary cases was inconsistent with City of
Arlington's determination that Chevron applies to "big, important" issues. 153
The government also argued that Utility Air and Brown & Williamson
involved determinations of clear meaning under Chevron, not exceptions to
the Chevron framework. 154 At oral argument, one of the few questions the
Chief Justice asked was about Chevron whether a decision issued under
Chevron would allow a future administration to change the IRS's current
allowance for tax credits. 155
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the IRS's
rules but flatly rejected Chevron deference. 156 Citing Brown & Williamson and
Utility Air, Roberts held that King was an "extraordinary case" presenting
questions of "deep 'economic and political significance."' 157 As a result, the
Court determined de novo the meaning of the ACA, rather than assuming
Congress implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the IRS.158
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts found the IRS's lack of expertise in
1 59
health insurance to be another reason to withhold Chevron deference.
When rejecting Chevron, Roberts did not cite City ofArlington or address its
apparent rejection of a Step Zero exception for extraordinary cases.t 30 He
also disregarded the fact that Utility Air was an extraordinary case decided
under Chevron. 16 1 Nor did he clarify why King was extraordinary even

&

149. Br. for Pct'rs at 52, King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) (quoting
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014), and FDA v. Brown
Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
150. Id. at 53-55.
151. Id. at 55-56.
152. Br. for Resp'ts, King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
153. Id. at 29 (quoting (ity ofArlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)).
154. Id.
155.
Oral Argument at 76:12-15, King v. Burwll, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), available at
http://www.supremccourt.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/

14-114_lkhn.pdf

The Govcrnment could not rule out this possibility. Id. at 76:16-19.

156.

King, 135 S. Ct. at. 2488-89, 2496).

Justices Kennedy, Sotomayor, Kagan,

Ginsburg, and Brcycr joined the majority. Justices Alito and Thomas joincdJusticc Scalia's
dissenting opinion. Id. at 2484.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 2488-89.
Id.
Id. (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266-68 (2006)).
Id. at 2485-96
King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
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rules did not present concerns over expanded
although Justice Scalia has long opposed exceptions
Finally,
jurisdiction.
to Chevron,1t 3 his dissent did not expressly object to the majority's failure to
apply Chevron. 16 4
These inconsistencies in the Court's recent decisions magnify uncertainty
over the deference doctrine. Future courts will be required to delineate
which agency interpretations are politically and economically significant
enough for de novo judicial review. 165 They will also have to decide
whether City ofArlington or King should govern extraordinary cases that also
involve expansions of regulatory jurisdiction. 166 Further, courts will not
know whether decisions outside an agency's area of expertise should receive
Skidmore deference, as in Gonzales v. Oregon, 16 7 or no deference whatsoever, as
though

the

IRS's

162

in King. 168
Even worse, efforts to clarify the scope of King are unlikely to produce a
deference-oriented framework for agency interpretations of broadly-worded
statutes.
In King, the Court determined statutory meaning based on
relatively specific evidence of statutory text, structure, and purpose.169 In
other cases, however, de novo interpretation may invite judicial

162. Id. ChicfJustice Roberts relied on Brown & Williamson and Utility Air, both of which
involved controversial expansions of regulatory jurisdiction. Id.
163. United States v. Mcad Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-261 (2001) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
164. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496-507 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
165. As noted abovc, this exception was once linked to jurisdictional concerns that no
longer seem to offer a tenable distinction under City ofArlington. See supra notes 127-140. In
dctermining that King was an extraordinary case, ChiefJustice Roberts noted the large
amount of money and number of peoplc affected by agency regulations central to the
statutory schemc. 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (rcasoning that tax credits involve "billions of dollars in
spending" and affect "the price of hcalth insurance for millions of peoplc"); see alo Util. Air
Regulatory Gp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (finding the decision to require permits
for operation of millions of small sources of greenhouse gas cmissions was one of "vast
'cconomic and political significancc"' under Chevron Step Two). Roberts may also have
sidestepped Chevron to avoid harm that future change in policy could cause for millions of
peoplc relying on the govcrnment's tax credits. Oral Argument at 76:12-15, King, 135 S.
Ct. 2480, available at http://www.supremccourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts
/14-114_lkhn.pdf
Further, Eincr Elhaugc argues that the extraordinary case exception
applics to agency decisions that are politically salient but lack support from both the current
Congress and the President. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 104 (2008).
166. As noted abovc, when the EPA dramatically expanded its regulatory jurisdiction to
cover stationary sources of greenhouse gas cmissions, the Court reviewed that decision
under the Chevron framcwork. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
167. 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) (holding that Attorncy Gencral's interpretation of
"legitimate medical purposc" receives deference "in accordance with Skidmore").
168. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-90 (2015).
169. 135 S. Ct. at 2502.
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interference with policy questions assigned to the Executive Branch. 170 For
example, criticism of Brown & Williamson focuses on the Court's elevation of
policy concerns over plain language showing a broad delegation of
authority. 171 Contextual analysis is also likely to impose a heavy policy
burden for judges facing statutes that are more open-ended than the ACA.
Despite these problems, de novo review might insulate the Chevron
framework from controversial cases and lead to a deference-oriented
framework in others. 172 As things stand, however, Chevron raises its own set
of concerns over lack of appropriate deference. In City of Arlington, for
example, Justice Scalia seemed to invite reversal of agency interpretations
at Step One. His opinion directs courts to take "seriously" and apply
"rigorously" statutory limits on agency decisions. 173 This call for aggressive
Step One analysis could further damage Chevron's framework. The Court's
subsequent decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA adds to these
concerns by limiting deference at Step Two.
3. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA Encourages Courts to Withhold Deference
under Chevron
Justice Scalia's opinion in Utility Air further upended the Chevron
framework. The case arose under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and involved
two categories of EPA permit requirements for stationary sources that emit
greenhouse gases: (1) new permit requirements for sources regulated only
due to their greenhouse gas emissions; and (2) additional obligations for
sources already subject to other permitting requirements. 1 4 SevenJustices
approved the EPA's latter category of permit requirements, but five voted
to invalidate the new permit requirements. 175
While the CAA generally required permits for major stationary sources
emitting "any air pollutant," its numeric thresholds triggered massive new
permit requirements for greenhouse gas emissions.176 The CAA required

170. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 (2013) (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting) ("Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself
policymaking properly lcft, under the separation of powers, to the Executive.").
171. Molot, supra note 25, at 67-68.
172. See gcncrally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 911-12.
173. (ity ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
174. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436-39 (2014).
175. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion that was joined
in full byJustices Roberts and Kennedy. Justices Brcycr, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg
joined the part of the opinion approving the EPA's additional regulatory requirements for
firms already subject to regulation. Justices Alito and Thomas joined the part of the opinion
rejecting the EPA's new permitting requirements.
176. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
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the EPA to impose permit requirements for emissions in excess of 100-250
tons per year. 177 Greenhouse gas emissions, however, were "orders of
magnitude greater than emissions of conventional pollutants." 178 Thus, the
EPA anticipated that statutory permit thresholds for greenhouse gases
would require "unprecedented expansion of EPA authority," "touch every
household in the land," but still be "ineffective" at reducing air pollution. 17
The EPA responded to this dilemma by regulating stationary greenhouse
gas emissions pursuant to relaxed numeric thresholds. 180
Justice Scalia found the EPA's regulation an impermissible interpretation
of the CAA.181
He acknowledged that the CAA's general permit
requirements for "any air pollutant" were broad and "ambiguous." 182
Nevertheless, he decided that "air pollutant" meant something "obviously
narrower," holding impermissible the EPA's interpretation under Step Two
of Chevron. 183 Justice Scalia offered two reasons to insist on his narrow
interpretation of the CAA. 184 First, he argued the statutory structure shows
that the category of regulated air pollutants was limited to those emitted by
a "handful of large sources." 185 Second, Justice Scalia rejected the EPA's
interpretation because "it would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority without clear
congressionalauthorization."186
Justice Scalia's second reason converts the extraordinary cases exception
from Brown & Williamson to a new, anti-deference tenet of Chevron. He
expects "Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency
decisions of vast 'economic and political significance."' 1 8
But the
expectation of clear statutory authorization stands the entire concept of
Chevron deference-upholding agencies' permissible interpretations of
ambiguous statutes18W-on its head.
To be sure, in other contexts the Court has been reluctant to assume that
Congress will "alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
(1984).

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437-38 (2014).
Id. at 2442.
Id. at 2444.
Id. at 2441-42.
Id. at 2443-44.
Id. at 2443.
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). (cmphasis added).
Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
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vague terms or ancillary provisions" or "hide elephants in mouseholes." 18 9
In Utility Air, however, Justice Scalia could not pretend that CAA's
sweeping grant of regulatory authority was a mere mousehole. 1o)() Instead,
Justice Scalia responded to broad statutory language with a presumption
against deference. This presumption was triggered by disfavored policy
consequences. It also reflected an ad hoc determination that the EPA's
decision requiring millions of permits of small sources fell within a "class of
authorizations" the Court was "reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory
text."
As Thomas Merrill suggested, this ruling lacks "announced
criteria"'( 1 to distinguish the types of authorizations triggering an antideference presumption from the types of authorizations leaving space for

agency policy decisions. 192
A presumption against deference is highly problematic for any
understanding of Chevron as a doctrine that actually does what it is supposed
to do-grant agencies deference. Indeed, if Congress clearly authorized
agency action, there would be no need for Chevron deference (or perhaps
even a lawsuit) because Congress would have already directly resolved the
dispute. Further, generally-worded mandates permeate the landscape of
regulatory statutes("3 Justice Scalia's new presumption raises even more
doubts as to which generally-worded statutory provisions qualify for Chevron
deference. As explained below, Chevron's flawed framework already makes
this question highly uncertain.

189.

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). In this case, the

Court refused to construc alleged ambiguity in the Clcan Air Act (CAA) as permitting
consideration of costs. The issue was not decided under Chevron, but in response to the D.C.
Circuit's decision that part of the CAA unconstitutionally dclcgated lcgislative authority to
the EPA. See Craig N. Orcn, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns-The Ghost ofDelegation
Revived... and Exorcised, in ADMINISTRATIVE Lxw STORIES 7, 39-40 (2006).
190. Thus, it differs from two of the additional cascsJusticc Scalia cites. In MCI, Justice
Scalia argued the FCC's power to "modify" rate-filing requirements was limited to smaller

adjustments than the FCC had authorized.

See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). In

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the Court considered
adopted a narrow construction of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to avoid finding
that its "open-cnded grant" was an unconstitutional dclcgation of legislative power.

See

Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-646 (1980) (plurality
opinion).

Though

Utility Air is factually closcr to Brown and Williamson, Utilit Airs

presumption agaist authorization becomes part of Chevron Step Two analysis rather than an
exception to deference or a finding of clarity under Step Onc.
191.

Merrill, Step Zero, supra note 96 at 783-85.

192.

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444-45 (2014).

193.

See infra notes 309-319 and accompanying text.
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II. STEP ONE OF CHEVRON RESTS ON AN ARTIFICIAL AND CONTENTIOUS
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Courts' inconsistent application of Chevron can be traced to its flawed,
two-step framework. Under Step One, a court must determine whether
Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 1 94 If the
statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," then the
court moves to Step Two and defers to agency decisions "based on a
permissible construction of the statute." 195
Under Chevron, if a court is inclined to withhold deference and override
an agency's decision, it is most likely to do so at Step One and find that the
agency's policy contravenes the "unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."96 Courts generally defer to agencies under Step Two (whether
the agency has adopted a "permissible" or "reasonable" construction of the
statute). 197 Thus, problems with inconsistent levels of deference are best
addressed at Step One, given that this step's analytical framework has failed
to provide a workable standard for reviewing courts.
Under Chevron, courts have struggled to apply Step One's criteria and
determine whether a statute is "clear" or "silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue" addressed by the agency. Their struggle reflects two
troublesome elements of Step One: its artificial conceptual framework and
the vehement disagreement over the correct method of interpreting
statutes.
A. Artficial Conceptual Framework
At first blush, the search for clear meaning might seem to reiterate
judges' concerns with identifying lawful limits of agency action-the
agency's interpretation may not exceed "the bounds of [the agency's]
statutory authority."1 98
Step One of Chevron, however, addresses this
concern using a legal fiction. The test assumes Congress intended to grant
an agency primary interpretive authority whenever a statute it administers
is ambiguous or silent.
By expressing this concern as a search for clarity

&

194. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 842-44; Kerr, supra note 72, at 31 ("Thus, courts resolving applications at step
one uphcld the agency interpretations only 42% of the time . . and those resolving
applications at step two uphcld the agency view in 89% of the applications."); Miles
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 838 n.26 ("More than 90 percent of [Supreme Court]
invalidations under Chevron occurred under Step Onc.").
197. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 242-44.
198. City ofArlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
199. See generaly Dufly, supra note 51, at 190 (arguing the Court's dctermination of
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or ambiguity, Step One fails to distinguish between generally- and
precisely-worded statutes.
Critics of Chevron Step One complain that its test can be bent to support
almost any outcome a judge may desire. 200 In non-agency casesjudges are
routinely required to derive clear meaning from ambiguous language in
order to resolve the parties' dispute. Distinguishing clarity from ambiguity
requires judges to make conceptually difficult categorical judgments.2 0'1 It is
psychologically difficult for a judge to set aside the role of determining clear
meaning and leave room for an agency's policy decision.20 2 As a result,
clarity and ambiguity have become empty concepts, and the Court has not
mapped them to meaningful differences in the language Congress uses.
Step One fails to account for variety in how specifically or generally
Congress drafts statutes.20 3
Further, whether a judge searches for clear statutory meaning using a
purposive or textual methodology, the interpretive inquiry prompts judges
to draw a fairly specific meaning from ambiguous or incomplete statutory
text. 204 Purposivism prompts judges to use a statute's general purpose or
goal to assign particular statutory meaning. 205 Textualism instructs judges
that a statute's "plain meaning" will "solve most statutory puzzles."20
Judges use these interpretive methods both to identify whether a statute has
clear meaning in agency cases and construct meaning from ambiguous
statutory provisions in non-agency cases.0o Thus, it is not surprising that
courts are inclined to assign specific meaning to regulatory statutes under
Chevron.
The framework applied by textualist judges makes it especially difficult
for them to recognize statutory ambiguity. 2 08 Textualist judges prioritize
text over Congressional intent. A key textualist objection to intent is that it

"clear" statutory meaning under the first part of Chevron is "unremarkablc," while Chevron's
innovation is its requirement of dcfercnce in the face of statutory silence or ambiguity).
200.

Merrill, supra note 96, at 783.

201.
202.

Gersen & Vcrmculc, supra note 21, at 695.
Brcycr, supra note 27, at 379.
203. One might think these differences ought to relate to Court's Step One inquiry:
gcncral language tends to bc ambiguous and specific language tends to be clear. But the
Court has not applied Chevron in this manner.
204.

Brcssman, supra note 21, at 551.

205.

ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 229.

206.
207.

Id. at 231.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9

(1984) (stating that courts are to apply "traditional tools of statutory construction" to
ascertain whether "Congress had an intention on the precise question at issuc").
208.

See Hon. Scalia, supra note 62, at 521.
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20
is impossible to assign a single intent to a multi-member legislative body.
At the same time, however, textualists assume Congress has provided a
single, objectively determinable meaning in statutory text. 210) This assumes,
however, that "statutes have a legal meaning before the process of
interpretation," even though "an ambiguous statute lacks any clear
preexisting meaning." 211 This analytical framework is designed to deny
existence of textual ambiguity.
Given these problems, it is not surprising that Chevron has facilitated some
exceedingly aggressive textualist interpretations of generally worded
statutes. 212 In MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI) v. American Telephone
Telegraph Co. (AT&7),213 for example, the FCC argued the
Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) allowed it to "modify"
statutory rate-filing requirements. 214 These requirements were originally
designed to regulate a single monopoly carrier in long-distance
telecommunications, and the FCC held they did not apply when the market
finally opened up to competing carriers.2 15 After considering an argument
that the Communications Act contained "sufficient ambiguity" to afford the
FCC's interpretation Chevron "deference" Justice Scalia insisted that select
dictionary definitions and statutory structure required a narrower reading
of the term "modify." 216 Justice Scalia's majority opinion struck down the
FCC's interpretation even though countervailing textualist evidence was
weak and the FCC's position was supported by "at least one standard
dictionary definition."2 1
In Brown & Williamson, Justice O'Connor aggressively manufactured a
"clear intent" to preclude the FDA from regulating tobacco products. 218 As
noted above, the FDCA generally authorized the FDA to regulate "drugs"
and "devices." Still, the Court derived an anti-regulatory intent from the
high-stakes policy issue and context provided by "later-enacted statutes
2
regulating tobacco labeling and advertising." 1

209. ANTONIN
Lxw 23-25 (1997).

SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

210. DANIEL A. FARBER AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, L41V AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 92 (1991).
211. Id. at 92 (cmphasis in original).
212. Indeed, two of Jonathan Molot's icading examples of aggressive textualism are
Chevron cases. Molot, supra note 25, at 66
213. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 220-22.
216. Id. at 225-29.
217. Molot, supra note 25, at 66-67.
218. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)
219. Molot, supra note 25, at 67-68. For additional examples of aggressive textualist
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These examples are not meant to imply that generally-worded statutes
always require a decision in favor of the agency. Agencies can sometimes
choose policies that fall outside of general parameters. 220 Nor is general
language the only type of language that may give rise to ambiguity. 221 As
explained below, however, general language raises fundamental concerns
under Chevron because such language permeates the landscape of regulatory
statutes.
The Communications Act and FDCA are by no means the only
regulatory statutes containing general directives.
Indeed, Congress
sometimes words regulatory statutes so broadly that they are challenged as
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. In Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, Inc., 222 for example, the Court considered and rejected
a delegation doctrine challenge to generally worded CAA provisions.
These provisions required the EPA to set air quality standards "requisite to
protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety." 223 The
Court also noted that it had rejected delegation challenges to several other
regulatory statutes with open-ended mandates. 224
These examples
underscore the fact that Congress has limited ability to avoid general

interpretations of regulatory statutes, see Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Stccl, Inc., 497

U.S. 116, 136-37 (1990) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (opining that statutory text precluded ICC's
finding that fraudulent billing fell within the "unrcasonable practicc" exception to filed rate

requirement); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (plurality opinion) joining
the plurality opinion, in which Justice Scalia applied textualist methodology to reject the
Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps') interpretation of "the waters of the United States," was
ChicfJusticc Roberts,Justice Thomas, andJustice Alito); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (basing dissent in part on argument that common
usage of phrasc "of forcign manufacturc" is to refer to goods manufactured abroad).

220.

AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S.

366,

387 (1999)

(holding the FCC's

requirements for blanket unbundling of telecommunication network clcments failed to
account for the statutc's "necessary and impair" standards).

221.
222.
223.

See discussion ofKing v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), infra part III.A.2.
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012); American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 465.

&

The Public Utility Holding
224. The Court's examples included scycral statutes.
Company Act authorized the Securitics and Exchange Commission (SEC) to modify
company structures to ensure that they did not "unfairly or incquitably distribute voting
power among security holders." American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (citing American Power

Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)). The Emergency Price Control Act allowed the
wartime Office of Price Administration Wartime to fix the prices of commoditics at a lcvcl
that "'will bc gcncrally fair and equitablc." Id. at 474 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 420, 423-26 (1944)). The Communications Act and the Interstate Commercc Act
authorized the FCC and ICC to regulate in the "public interest." Id. (citing National

Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943), and New York Central
Securitics Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)).
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directives to agencies. 225
General delegations to administrative agencies will in many instances
present an optimal legislative strategy. David Spence and Frank Cross
advance a "transaction cost explanation," which reflects Congress's
disadvantage in amassing information needed for specific regulatory
legislation. 226
In order for Congress to inform itself of appropriate
regulatory action, it would "have to embark on an enormously costly selfeducation program and on the expansion of the congressional
bureaucracy." 2 2
Thus, Congress stands at a marked disadvantage to
agencies when it comes to making specific policy choices.228 Congress's
informational deficit is even larger when one considers a regulatory statute's
need to adapt to changed circumstances and new learning. 229 Congress
lacks the ability to predict the future at the time it passes a statute.
Congress also has strong political incentives to avoid detailed statutory
language. It is easier to obtain consensus on a vague statutory provision
than to resolve the additional controversies posed by more detailed
statutory language. 2 so Further, general statutory language may allow
legislators to "please the public by taking action" but distance themselves
from negative consequences that inevitably accompany any specific

policy.

23 1

Some will certainly raise normative objections to the incentives created
225. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 212; see also McNollgast, supra 33, at 714 (stating
"statutory language can only rarely bc precisc").
226. Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135.
227.

Id. at 136.

228. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, TheNondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of
Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZo L. REV. 947, 967 (1999) (stating that agencies
have a cadrc of "policy experts who can run tests and experiments, gather data, and
otherwisc dctermine the wiscst course of policy"); see alo David Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agenc Dicretion, 38 AM.J. POL. SCI. 697,

699 (1994).
229. Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 136 ("Wisc regulatory commands should bc
flexible enough to adapt to changes in circumstances. . . ."); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24,
at 212 ("[G]cncral language is required to allow for necessary regulatory flexibility and

updating.").
230. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 212 (noting Congress may use gcncral
language because it "cannot assemble majority support for preciscly worded statutes"); see
alo WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGEJR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994) (stating
"the goals of at least some of the authors are to create rather than avoid ambiguity" and this
"cxplains the popularity of referring difficult issues to courts and/or agencies through
dccgation of authority or through the use of highly gcncralized terms that have to bc fleshed
out (or both)").
231. See Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 138; see also Brcssman, supra note 21, at 568
("Congress might attempt to avoid blame for controversial policy choices by shifting them to
agencies, while still claiming credit for broad solutions to public problems.").
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by political expediency. However, the Supreme Court has not interpreted
the Constitution to preclude Congress from delegating controversial policy
determinations to agencies. Congress needs to provide only an "intelligible
principle" in order for a broad grant of regulatory authority to pass
constitutional muster. 2 2
Moreover, it will often be difficult to tell whether Congress used general
language based on political concerns or the more legitimate desire to
delegate due to lack of information and expertise. Thus, it is not surprising
Justice Stevens's opinion in Chevron expressly disclaims any attempt to
identify reasons for ambiguous statutory terms. 233 The default rule is
instead one in which ambiguity for any reason triggers deference. As noted
above, there are many reasons why it is sound to assume Congress, in using
general language, made no decision on specific policy questions and instead
left them to the agency.
These incentives have not led Congress to pass generally-worded
statutory provisions in every instance. Some statutory provisions contain
specific numeric thresholds 234 or formulas for agency calculations.2 3 5
Specific statutory terms can sometimes be combined with general ones,
such as in the Clean Air Act. Chevron's clarity/ambiguity test, however, has
not been applied in a manner that accounts for the differences in specificity
of language Congress uses.
One of Chevron's central flaws, then, is that Step One fails to tailor
analysis to differences in statutory language.
This lack of tailoring
undermines interests in consistency and predictability. It is still possible for
a judge applying Chevron to derive clear meaning from general statutory
terms like "drugs," "devices," and "modify."
Step One's untailored
approach also omits nuances judges may find helpful in resolving complex
issues raised by regulatory statutes.
B. Disagreementover InterpretiveMethodology
Divisive questions of interpretive methodology also undermine consistent

232.

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) ("We have

almost ncycr felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can bc lcft to those executing or applying the law.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).

233.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-65

(1984) (noting ambiguity may exist because Congress intended to dccgate specific decisions
to expert agency administrators because Congress cither "simply did not consider the
question at [a specific] lcycl" or becausc "Congress was unable to forge a coalition" that was
needed to resolve particular contested policy issues).

234.
235.

See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
See, e.g, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 85 (2007).
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application of Chevron. 23 6 Deciding whether an agency has stayed within the
bounds of its statutory authority ultimately requires judges to determine
what the statute means. But judges do not agree what interpretive method,
textualism or purposivism, they should use to determine statutory
meaning.2 3 1 By implicating this methodological debate, Chevron Step One
invites judges to find reasons to disagree rather than agree.
Whether a statute is clear or ambiguous under Step One can depend
heavily on the interpretive method used by a reviewing judge. Step One's
interpretive controversy erupted almost immediately after Chevron and
shows no signs of abating. 238 In MCI v. AT&T 239 for example, the Court
split 5-3,240 and the dissenting Justices raised purposivist objections to the
majority's aggressive textualism. 241 Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
challenged Justice Scalia's insistence on a narrow textual meaning drawn
from select dictionary definitions. 242 He also criticized Scalia's failure to
consider the broader purpose of the Communications Act's rate-filing
requirements.2 4 3
Purposivism, on the other hand, can be equally divisive when it leads
judges to prioritize historical evidence over contrary terms specified in the
statute. The Court's 2007 decision in uni Public School District No. 89 v.
Department of Education244 is a case in point.
Although Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court, he convinced only Justice Ginsburg to
join his opinion without writing separately. Justices Stevens and Kennedy,
joined by Justice Alito, filed concurring opinions, and Justice Scalia
dissented along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Souter.245

236. Gluck, supra note 23, at 618-19.
237. Abbc R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Intelpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE LJ. 1750, 1753 (2010) (noting prominent
arguments that "judges will ncycr bc able to reach consensus on a singlc, overarching
methodological framcwork for all statutory cases").
238. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Scrv. v. Cardoza-Fonscca, 480 U.S. 421,
452-53 (1987) (ScaliaJ., concurring) ("Wherc the language of [the law] is clear, we are not
free to replace it with an unenacted lcgislative intent."); Strauss, supra note 54, at 1124-25
(discussing interpretive tension).
239. See infra discussion Part II.A.
240. MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 219 (1994). Justice Scalia's majority opinion was
joined by ChicfJustice Rehnquist andJustices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. Justice
Stcycns' dissent was joined byJustices Souter and Blackmun, andJusticc O'Connor did not
participate in the casc. Id.
241. Id. at 235-45 (1994) (Stcycns,J., dissenting).

242. Id. at 241-42.
243. Id. at 243-45.
244. 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
245.

Id. at 83.
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In uni, the Court was asked to review the Department of Education's
certification that New Mexico equalizes educational expenditures among
school districts.
The decision turned on whether the Secretary of
Education's underlying calculations complied with the federal Impact Aid
Act (Impact Aid).246 Specifically, Impact Aid directed the Secretary to
calculate state-wide equalization of expenditures by "disregard[ing] local
educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the
95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures or revenues
in the State." 247
Rather than calculating percentiles by ranking
expenditures for "local educational agencies" (or districts), department
officials calculated these percentiles by ranking expenditures based on the
proportion of the state's population included in a particular district. 248
Justice Breyer found that considerations "other than language" gave the
Court "unusually strong indications" Congress did not intend to preclude
the Secretary's method of calculation.2' These considerations included the
history of the Act, and the purpose of the Act, and the fact that the
calculations involved a "highly technical, specialized interstitial matter." 25 0
The history of Impact Aid was particularly supportive of the Secretary:
The present statutory language originated in draft lcgislation that the
Secretary himself sent to Congress in 1994. With one minor change
(irrclevant to the present calculation controversy), Congress adopted that
language without comment or clarification.
No one at the time-no
Member of Congress, no Department of Education official, no school district
or State-cxpressed the view that this statutory language (which, after all,
was supplied by the Secretary) was intended to require, or did require, the
Secretary to change the Department's system of calculation, a system that the
Department and school districts across the Nation had followed for nearly 20
years, without (as far as we are told) any adverse effect. 251
Justice Breyer concluded that the language of Impact Aid was ambiguous
and held the Secretary's method of calculation lawful. 252
Justice Breyer's approach did not gain widespread support. Justices
Kennedy and Alito concurred, agreeing with Justice Breyer's conclusion
that the statute was ambiguous but expressing reservations about Justice
Breyer's unorthodox approach of downplaying the statutory text. 253 In his

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 86.
20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
20 U. S. C. § 7709(b)(2)(A); Zuni, 550 U.S. at 88-89.
Zuni, 550 U.S. at 90.
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2007).
Id. (cmphasis added).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 107 (Kennedy,J., concurring).

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

20151

Do NoT DELETE

/2
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

SELLIANGCHEVRON

515

dissent, Justice Scalia railed against Justice Breyer's analysis, comparing it
to Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 254 and arguing that the text of the
federal Impact Aid Act required the Court to invalidate the Secretary's
decision under Step One of Chevron. 255 Justice Souter joined the portion of
Justice Scalia's dissent holding that Impact Aid unambiguously foreclosed
the Secretary's calculations. 256
The Court's competing interpretive approaches add to Chevron's
problems. As Jack Beermann aptly notes, the Court's distinct interpretive
approaches "can lead to different results." 25 7 He finds that Chevron review
can be "virtually indistinguishable" from pre-Chevron review, and that
Chevron has failed to afford agencies more deference or clarify the law. 258
This is not surprising. If judges become bogged down by disagreement
over methodology, they will have trouble agreeing that different textual
cues support different results under Chevron. Further, the lack of agreement
on interpretive method contributes to inconsistent and unpredictable
applications of Chevron.
When considered from the perspective of an administrative agency,
competition between textualist and purposivist methodology magnifies
uncertainty. It is well known that agencies rely on legislative history in
evaluating particular readings of statutory text. 25') This purposive inquiry is
contrary to the textualist approach taken by some reviewing judges. Thus,
judicial review of agency interpretations raises the possibility of a dual
standard.
Whether this dual standard will apply turns on whether the reviewing
judges randomly selected to review the case are textualists or purposivists.
Thus, lawyers representing agencies or interested parties should address all

Church of the Holy Trniy v. United States is a "lcading
254. 143 U. S. 457 (1892).
purposivist authority," in which the Court invoked the "spirit" of a statute to justify an
interpretation that seemed to depart from the statutc's plain language. ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 229.
255. Zuni, 550 U.S. at 122 (Scalia,J.,dissenting).
256. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 123 (2007) (Soutr,J.,
dissenting).
257. Professor Bccrmann breaks Chevron Step One into four versions: (1) "original
directly spoken Chevron;" (2) "traditional tools Chevron;" (3) "plain meaning Chevron;" and (4)
"cxtraordinary cases Chevron." Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 817. While the Court has ncvcr
consistently applied the "directly spoken" test, its failure to choose between the traditional
tools and plain meaning test makes Chevron a "moving target." Id. at 817-22.
258. Id.
259. Strauss, supra note 36, at 329-30 (stating, "Legislative history has a centrality and
importance for agency lawycrs," which may assist their "understanding" or "justification" of
particular readings of statutory text); see abo Gluck, supra note 23, at 631.
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possible variations of Step One. 26o While this scattershot approach may be
a workable solution for a lawyer fulfilling her professional obligations, the
uncertainty remains troubling for the agency. The agency must invest
great resources in rulemaking or formal adjudication, only to risk having
the result of its proceeding vacated according to a different interpretive
methodology. This possibility amplifies problems caused by inconsistent
application of Chevron.
III. CONTRACT LAW OFFERS TAILORED, COMPROMISE APPROACHES TO
INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS POSED BY CHEVRON

Contract law can shed new light on Chevron's interpretive problems.
General similarities between statutory interpretation and contractual
interpretation have been widely recognized. 261 As with interpretation of
statutes, contractual interpretation emphasizes judicial restraint and the
importance of deferring to the parties' intent. 262 Moreover, both regulatory
statutes and contracts have drawn competing interpretive methodologies on
judicial review.
Under contract law, however, different interpretive
methodologies may be understood to vary according to parties' differing
incentives to commit specific contractual terms to writing.
Contract law utilizes different interpretive methods for deciding when a
writing is clear on its face or open to additional meanings. Courts have
applied different interpretive methods, and they have sometimes allowed
interpretive methods to vary within the same jurisdiction.26 3 Although
these varied interpretive methodologies do not follow simple rules, they
may be understood according to differing incentives of drafting parties.264
These incentives reflect two key factors: transaction costs of putting a term

260. See Bccrmann, supra note 5, at 822 (cxplaining that unless "it becomes casicr to
predict which variant a court will apply in a particular casc" all possibilitics should bc
addressed); see also GARY L4wSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE L4w

130 (6th cd.) ("It

remains unprofessional for an administrative lawycr not to bc intimately familiar with the
lcgislative history of any statute with which he or she is dealing in court.").
261. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
262. 11 Williston on Contracts §32:2 (4th cd. 2014) (stating that the "ovcrriding
principlc that courts must effectuate [is] the intention of the partics"). As noted abovc,
congressional intent is a key basis for Chevron deference. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text. Even those who object to this basis as a fiction recognizc that courts must interpret the
regulatory statute to identify statutory limits on the agencies' cxcrcise of discretion. See
Scidenfeld, supra note 51, at 277 n.13, 296. In interpretation statutes gcncrally, textualists
focus on objective evidence of congressional intent found in statutory text. See John F.
Manning, Textualim as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 696 (1997).
Purposivists cmbracc a more open-cnded inquiry into congressional intent.
263.

See infra notes 287-291 and surrounding text.

264.

See infra notes 287-297.
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in writing and the value parties place on enforcement of that term. 2 5
Emphasis on textual evidence makes less sense when transaction costs
exceed the value of the term. 266
The Uniform Commercial Code's hierarchical interpretive framework
also suggests broader grounds for interpretive compromise. The UCC
directs courts to prioritize specific text over non-textual sources of meaning
and to prioritize reliable extra-textual sources of meaning over less reliable
non-textual evidence of meaning.
The section below describes these
aspects of contract law, how they could be incorporated into Chevron
analysis, and how contractual interpretation principles could make Chevron
deference more predictable.
A. ContractLaw Offers Semi- Tailored Interpretive Frameworks
Parties to contracts sometimes ask courts to fill gaps when a written
contract is silent with respect to certain contingencies. 267 The court's role
in filling contractual gaps implicates an interpretive gatekeeping function
similar to that addressed in Chevron. Courts must decide whether a written
agreement has a gap, which allows the writing to be supplemented with
terms or meaning based on extrinsic evidence of the parties' earlier
negotiations or dealings. 268 In administrative law, the similar interpretive
question is whether a statute has a gap that may be supplemented by
agency policy decisions.
In contract law, this gatekeeping analysis is governed by the parol
evidence rule.2 69 Eric Posner offers a helpful classification of "hard" and
"soft" parol evidence rule as two dominant versions of the rule.270 Different
versions of the rule reflect whether courts will determine the existence of a
gap based on the written agreement alone or by supplementing the writing
with extrinsic evidence. 271 Existence of a gap reflects both the contract's
incompleteness and ambiguity. Writings that are "long and detailed,"
address "the most important contingencies," and contain a merger clause
will generally be considered complete.27 2 Writings are generally ambiguous
"when the writing has conflicting terms or no provision relating to the
contingency under which the dispute arises." 273
265.

Posncr, supra note 34, at 545.

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id
Id. at 533.
Id
Id
Id. at 534.
Posncr, supra note 34, at 534
Id. at 535.
Id.
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Under a hard parol evidence rule, courts bar extrinsic evidence and
focus solely on the writing to determine whether the contract has a gap due
to incompleteness or ambiguity. 2 74 This approach generally recognizes
"the parties' written expression of intent" as "the only relevant evidence of
objective intent." 275 The approach requires judges to focus on the plain
meaning of words in a contract,276 aided by dictionary definitions.211 If the
plain meaning is not clear, judges may also employ interpretive rules
reflecting canons of statutory construction or similar rules of thumb for
contracts. 278 Thus, this "plain meaning" approach provides that "contracts
should be interpreted in much the same manner as the New Textualists
2
interpret statutes today." 7'
Under a soft parol evidence rule, which is adopted by both the UCC and
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts will identify any gaps by giving
"weight both to the writing and to the extrinsic evidence." 82 (o The UCC's
soft approach discourages courts from aggressively constructing textual
meaning from independent judicial sources such as a dictionary281 or other
legal rules of construction. 282 The main difference between a hard and soft
parol evidence rule, then, is twofold. The first difference is whether to
identify gaps relying on the written agreement exclusively or whether to
consider written terms alongside extrinsic evidence of meaning. 283 The
second difference is how much emphasis judges should place on

274.

Id. at 534-35.

275. Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 200-01.
276. 11 Williston on Contracts § 32:3 (4th cd. 2014) ("The plain, common, or normal
meaning of language will bc given to words of a contract unless the circumstances show that
in a particular case a special meaning should bc attached to them.").
277. See, e.g., id. (citingEaston v. Washington County Insurance Co., 137 A.2d 332, 335-36 (Pa.
1957) (rclying on the dictionary definition to establish plain meaning of term "sheds" in a
contract)); see generally Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 223 (cxpressing that Williston's hardparol evidence rule approach is informed by the judge's view of the "plain meaning of the
text and dictionary definitions").
278. 11 Williston on Contracts § 32:8 ("resort[ing] to the secondary rules of contract
interpretation is appropriatc" where the plain meaning is unclear). Some of the rules
incorporate canons of statutory construction. See id. § 32:6 (advocating the maxim noscitur a
sociis where the meaning of a word is known by associate words); see also id.
32:10
(discussing the rule of ejusdem generis, where gcncral words that follow a specific listing of
things are interpreted to mean things of the same kind included in the specific listing). See
generaly Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 200-01.
279. Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 199.
280. Posncr, supra note 34, at 534.

281.

U.C.C. § 1-202 cmt. 1 (2012) ("This Act rejects both the 'lay-dictionary' and the

conveyancer's' reading of a commercial agreement.")

282.

U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b).

283.

Posncr, supra note 34, at 534-35.
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independent judicial sources, such as dictionaries and canons of
construction, when determining meaning of the contract.2 8 4
This difference in methods of contractual interpretation is similar to the
divide between purposive and textualist methods of statutory interpretation.
The hard parol evidence rule approach aligns with the methods textualists
use to identify gaps or ambiguities in Step One of Chevron-both focus on
text, text-based sources of meaning (dictionaries), and judicial canons of
construction. 28 5 The soft parol evidence rule approach, by contrast, aligns
with the methods purposivists use to identify gaps or ambiguities-while
both soft parol evidence rule and purposivism consider text and text-based
sources, they place less emphasis on text alone and more emphasis on nontextual sources of meaning such as purpose and legislative history.286
In contract law, courts have failed to uniformly adopt a hard or soft
interpretive approach.28 Sometimes common-law interpretive approaches
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.288 For example, Virginia adheres to a
hard parol evidence rule approach,28 while California has embraced a soft
parol evidence rule.290 In other states, courts have not settled on a single

284. As noted abovc, the hard parol evidence rule approach encourages judges to derive
plain meaning from dictionary definitions and canons of construction. See 11 Williston on
Contracts § 32:8 (4th cd. 2015) (supporting use of dictionarics and canons of constructions).
The soft parol evidence rule approach adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
on the other hand, expressly discourages judges from relying on rules of construction and lay
dictionarics as sources of meaning. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b) (rejecting meaning derived
from "rules of construction existing in the law"); U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (rejecting the
dictionary).
285. Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 223 (stating that both Williston's hard parol
evidence rule and Scalia's textualism rely on the text's plain meaning, dictionary definitions,
and canons of construction); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra notc 24, at 236, 261-62 (cxplaining that
textualists consider statutory text and contextual evidence such as dictionarics, and canons of
construction, while they reject non-tcxtual evidence of lcgislative intent or purposc).
286. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 309-10.
287. See Posncr, supra note 32, at 538. At common law there is a mix of jurisdictions
following the hard parol evidence rule and soft parol evidence rulc, and all states but
Louisiana have adopted the UCC's soft parol evidence rule for transactions in the sale of
goods.
288. Id. ("Although some jurisdictions use something like the hard [parol evidence rulc],
while other jurisdictions use something like the soft [parol evidence rulc], many jurisdictions
take different and often conflicting approaches to the treatment of cxtrinsic evidence.").

289.

See Pulaski Nat'l Bank v. Harrcll, 123 S.E.2d 382, 387 (Va. 1962) (noting that

Virginia strictly adhercs to the "rule which excludes parol evidence when offered to vary the
terms and conditions" of a clear and integrated contract).

290.

See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,

642-43 (Cal. 1968) (cn banc) (finding the trial court crred when it "refused to admit any
extrinsic evidence that would contradict" the contract's "plain meaning"); Posncr, supra note
34, at 539-40 (cxplaining the soft parol evidence rulc prevailed after the

1960s in

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

520

Do NoT DELETE

ADMISTIL4TIVEL4WREVIEW

/2
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

[67:3

interpretive approach, but use both soft and hard parol evidence rule in
different circumstances. 291
Admittedly, variations in the parol evidence rule are not simple to
apply. 292 Unlike statutory interpretation, however, scholars have offered
broader rationales to explain courts' use of varied interpretive approaches.
Eric Posner theorizes that judicial practice may be understood as adopting
a semi-tailored approach, in which courts' interpretive methodology varies
according to the incentives of contracting parties. 2')3 These incentives
reflect two key factors: transaction costs of putting a term in writing and the
value parties place on enforcement of that term. 294
Desirability of the hard or soft parol evidence rule may therefore vary in
different categories of cases. The hard parol evidence rule is more desirable
"when the transaction costs are less than the value of the promise" because
parties have incentives to commit the promise to writing to attain more
"accurate enforcement." 29 5 The soft parol evidence rule, on the other
hand, is more desirable "when transaction costs are greater than the value
of the promise."296 When transaction costs predominate, it is valuable to
have courts enforce aspects of the bargain that parties included in general
terms because they were too costly to specify in writing. 297
Posner does not offer global rules for identifying types of contracts best

California).
291. See, e.g., Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okla. 1985)
(stating that under Oklahoma law, parol evidence "cannot vary" or "modify" a written
agreement, but such evidence "is admissible to explain the meaning of words" when the text

of the agreement is ambiguous); Big G Corp. v. Henry, 536 A.2d 559, 561-62 (Vt. 1987)
(holding that under Vermont law, while "cxtrinsic or parol evidence may bC used" if a
writing is "found to bc ambiguous," a prior or contemporancous oral agreement may not bC
used to vary a written agreement). Compare Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of the State of
Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 133 (Conn. 1995) (demonstrating that in Connecticut, courts have
forbidden extrinsic evidence to vary plain meaning), with Shclton Yacht & Cabana Club,
Inc. v. Suto, 188 A.2d 493, 496 (Conn. 1963) (asserting that Connecticut courts consider
extrinsic evidence when deciding whether a writing was a complete expression of the partics'
agreement).

See generally Posncr, supra note 34, at 538-39 (noting that some courts take a

hard approach to completeness exceptions and a soft approach to ambiguity exceptions and
vice versa).
292. Posncr, smpra note 34, at 540 (noting that the parol evidence rulc has caused
"confusion" and "crics of despair" in virtually cycry jurisdiction).
293. Id. at 553-54 (offering "gcncral comments about recurring fact situations and
doctrines related to contractual interpretation").

294.
295.
296.

Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.

297. Id. Posncr also assumes that a hard parol evidence rule will lcad to lcss judicial
crror than a soft parol evidence rulc. As noted below, this assumption is not universal.
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suited to a particular approach. 298 This is understandable, given the
complex host of issues raised by interpretation. Posner does, however, offer
general guidance as to when a soft parol evidence rule and hard parol
evidence rule is preferable. A soft parol evidence rule is preferable when (1)
the contract's subject matter is complex or parties are unsophisticated and
(2) the conventional nature of the contract minimizes concern over lack of
enforcement due to judicial error.2 99 Conversely, a hard parol evidence
rule is preferable when (1) the subject matter is simple or parties are
sophisticated and (2) unconventional nature of the contract raises concern
over judicial error.3oo
For regulatory statutes, however, these factors point in opposite
directions. Although regulatory statutes often address complex problems
for which Congress (the drafter) lacks sophistication or expertise,so 1 these
statutes seem unlikely to present conventional interpretive matters that
minimize concern over lack of enforcement due to judicial error.o302 It is
unclear, under Posner's framework, whether courts should apply a soft or
hard interpretive methodology to identify gaps in regulatory statutes. It
may be that high transaction costs are the overriding concern. Posner
suggests, for example, that courts should apply a soft approach to legislation
that creates an "entirely new set of legal rights and entitlements or
administrative machinery." 03
Overriding transaction costs also suggest important distinctions in the
type of language Congress will enact. As described above, high transaction
costs and political expediency have sometimes led Congress to pass
generally-worded legislation.30 4 This is similar to the outcome one may
expect in long-term contracts, which, like regulatory statutes, are expected
to govern parties' relationships over an extended period of time. Such
contracts often contain "underspecified" terms, as "parties cannot at low
cost commit" to writing the entire long-term contract.305
For regulatory statutes, the link between enacted language and

298. Posncr, supra note 34, at 549-50.
299. Id. at 553 & fig.2.
300. Id.
301. Cross & Spence, supra note 40, at 135-36.
302. Issues presented in cases such as King v. Buwoell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), MCI v
AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), were by no means conventional. See supra discussion Parts I.B and III.A.2.
303. Posncr, supra note 34, at 573. Posncr contrasts it with "incremental modifications
of existing lcgislation" for which hard approach is more appropriate. Id.
304. Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135-36 (stating "Congress does not currently
enact highly specific lcgislation" due to transaction costs and political expediency).
305. Posncr, supra note 34, at 557.
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overriding transaction costs suggests a simple rule of thumb for Step One
analysis. When Congress uses general statutory language, it is reasonable
to assume Congress faced overriding transaction costs. As in contractual
interpretation, these overriding transaction costs provide good reasons to
apply a soft or purposive analysis when identifying statutory gaps.
Conversely, when Congress uses specific language, one may assume
transaction costs did not dominate. There are better reasons to determine
gaps using an approach that prioritizes textual meaning. The section below
will explore how these different textual cues would play out in leading
Chevron cases. Before this discussion, the section immediately below will
address why one should expect overriding transaction costs to call for a soft
or purposive approach in some regulatory cases.
1. Transaction Costs and Enforcement Valuesfor Public Law
Interpretation of statutes presents issues of public law, whereas
interpretation of contracts presents issues of private law. This section
explains why a contractual interpretation framework is helpful for public
statutes. Namely, transaction costs and expected enforcement values for
public statutes present a compelling argument for purposive interpretation
in certain cases.son As noted above, a purposive approach is generally
desirable when transaction costs of drafting outweigh the value parties place
on enforcement of particular terms. 3so The discussion below compares the
incentives of parties drafting contracts to incentives of legislators, finding
that legislative incentives provide even stronger reasons to expect
transaction costs to overwhelm the value of enforced statutory terms. It
also finds that a tailored purposive approach will not deprive third parties
of adequate notice of their legal obligations.
Congress faces immense transaction costs any time it wishes to enact a
new piece of legislation. Parties can easily enter contracts that determine
their legal obligations to one another, but a federal statute must pass
308
numerous procedural hurdles before it is legally binding on the public.
Statutory provisions must be considered and approved by applicable
committees, a majority of both houses of Congress, and the President (or a
supermajority of both houses of Congress) before they become law.son

306. Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 224-25 (offering additional grounds for preferring
a purposive approach in statutory interpretation).
307.

Posncr, supra note 34 at 545. This section of the paper refers to purposive statutory

interpretation, which is analogous to the soft parol evidence rule approach to contractual
interpretation. See supra note 270-286 and accompanying text.
308. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 70.

309.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Specific statutory language only makes it more difficult for Congress to
overcome these hurdles.
As noted above, regulatory statutes often
implicate complex issues for which Congress lacks information or ability to
predict future policy concerns.31()
Thus, even though some assume
Congress will address major issues,311 Congress may not know the major
regulatory issues or specific policies it should consider pinning down in
legislation.3 12 Specific language may also make it harder for Congress to
obtain the consensus needed to pass the legislation.3 13
What is more, Congress may place less value on enforcement of statutory
terms than parties to a private contract. One would not expect private
parties to benefit from existence of a contract beyond obtaining the terms
for which they have bargained. Congress, on the other hand, may benefit
from passing a statute regardless of how its terms are actually implemented
or enforced. Generally-worded statutes allow legislators to claim credit for
solutions to major problems while shifting blame to courts or agencies for
any unfavorable outcomes that flow from interpretation of general
language.3 14 Congress may also find that specific legislative terms lack
option value because they cannot easily accommodate new circumstances
or scientific knowledge.315
Therefore, Congress has strong incentives to enact generally-worded
regulatory statutes. Under Chevron, general language offers a low-cost way
to delegate complex decisions to agencies with greater expertise.
A
contrary understanding-such as that manifested in aggressive textual
analysis that fixes meaning of general language or expects clear
Congressional authorization-overlooks steep costs Congress faces to avoid
delegating in areas where it lacks expertise.3 16
Perhaps the same tradeoffs do not apply to generally-worded statutes
enacted before the Court's 1984 decision in Chevron.3 17 If earlier Congresses

310. Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135-36.
311. Brcycr, supra note 27, at 370-71 ("Congress is more likely to have focused upon,
and answered, major questions.").
312. See Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135-36 ("Congress would cither have to
cmbark on an enormously costly self-cducation program . . or clsc act with much lcss
information than agencies currently possess.").
313. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 205.
314. See Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 138 ("Vague, aspirational statutes are
attributable to strategic politics by lcgislatures."); Brcssman, supra note 21, at 568 (asserting
Congress balances diversc interests when it decides how much authority to grant agencies).
315.

Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135-36.

316. Id. at 135-37 (stating the "costs oflcgislating with specificity arc quite high" and the
"primary cost of specific is the cost of information" to inform parameters of regulatory
action).

317.

Scidenfeld, supra note 51, at 278.
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had been aware of Chevron deference, then maybe they would not have
enacted statutes with such general language.3 18 As explained below,
however, it is doubtful that Chevron has worked a great enough change to
alter assumptions about Congress's preferences for enacting generallyworded statutes.
Any time Congress enacts generally-worded legislation, it passes the
ability to make specific policy choices on to an agency or a judge.3 I') Even
before Chevron, there were many cases in which agencies acted as the
primary interpreter of a regulatory statute. Many agencies have substantial
power to issue rules or orders that operate with independent force of law.
Some regulated parties might comply with these rules without ever seeking
judicial review.20
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
moreover, not all agency decisions are subject to judicial review. 321 The
APA excludes from judicial review many discretionary acts that
nevertheless have great consequences for certain parties. 322
Even for matters subject to judicial review, courts had an established preChevron practice of deferring to agencies on certain interpretive questions.
They granted agencies substantial deference on mixed questions of law and
fact.323 Historically, courts also gave some weight to non-authoritative
agency interpretations. 324 After Chevron, courts extended the scope of
substantial deference to pure questions of law.325
Chevron's changes are matters of degree and expand on an earlier practice
of granting agencies some deference. While there is no clear evidence of

318. McNollgast, supra note 33, at 737.
319. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall take care that the laws
bc faithfully executed."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution."). Deference may make Congress
lcss willing to pass lcgislation because it could unravel originally agrced-to limitations on the
President's preferences.
320. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 14, at 878 (stating that the agency may bc the
"primary interpreter," as it "may bc that no court will cycr bc asked to review one of the
agency's rules" or reach the merits of the agency's decision).
321. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), 702, 704 (2012).
322. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 823, 837-38 (1985) (holding the FDA's
refusal to enforce FDCA requirements against states who administered lcthal injection drugs
was not subject to judicial review); Ctr. for Auto Safety & Pub. Citizcns, Inc. v. Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (NHTSA), 452 F.3d 798, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding the
NHTSA's policy guidclines on regional auto recalls were not final agency action and thus
not subject to judicial review).
323. Lawson & Kam, supra note 3, at 26-27.
324. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (finding the Administrator's
interpretations "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidancc").
325. Lawson & Kam, supra note 3, at 72.
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how past Congresses would have responded to Chevron, recent self-reporting
suggests Chevron has not driven current Congresses to avoid vague statutory
terms. 32M Given the many areas in which agencies had primary interpretive
authority prior to Chevron, earlier Congresses should not have been
surprised that some open-ended statutes would be interpreted primarily by
agencies.
Overall, Congress has even stronger incentives than contracting parties
to agree to open-ended terms. Contractual interpretation principles offer a
compelling case for applying a purposive interpretive methodology to
generally-worded statutes. Still, some scholars have argued that concerns
over notice to third parties make purposive methodology inappropriate for
public laws.3 2 In contract law, a purposive or soft approach would allow
evidence of earlier oral agreements to become part of the parties' binding
contract. There is no concern these parties lacked notice of the oral terms
because they actually participated in the earlier agreements or negotiations.
In statutory interpretation, however, a purposive approach could bind third
parties to standards contained in legislative history that they did not create
or of which they did not otherwise know. 32 8 Because a statute establishes
binding "rules of conduct" for third parties, the text of the statute must
32
notify them of these rules. 9
Despite this objection, concerns over notice do not pose a serious
objection to use of non-textual evidence to interpret regulatory statutes.
For starters, regulatory statutes subject to Chevron deference do not operate
directly on third parties. The agency empowered to enforce a statute with
the force of law must first interpret the regulatory statute, often using a
3
relatively formal process.s
o The processes through which agencies issue
binding interpretations are designed to illuminate the agency's reliance on

326. See DANIEL T. SHEDD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43203,
CHEVROVDEFERENCE: COURT TREATMENT OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF AMBIGUOUS
STATUTES 1 (2013) (cmphasizing that Congressional dclcgations of authority to
administrative agencies are often imprecisc).
In interviews, congressional counsels with
lcgislative drafting responsibility acknowledged "the prevalence of ambiguity in statutes,"
cyCn though they were also aware

dccgation."

that courts will consider "ambiguity as a signal of

Abbc R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Brcssman, Statutoy Intepretation from the

Inside-An Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafiing, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L.

REV. 901, 995-97 (2013).
327.

Mark L. Movscsian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failureof the Contract

Analogy in Statutoy Intepretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145, 1172-73 (1998).
328. Id. (cmphasizing that the essential point of a statute is that it is directed at third
persons outside the lcgislaturc).
329. Id. (cxplaining that because a person must follow the rules of conduct created by a
statute, "notice to third persons is . . . of critical importancc").

330.

United States v. Mcad Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001).
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legislative history. The APA obliges agencies to provide notice of "legal
authority" under which a rulemaking or adjudication is to be held, as well
as notice of matters of law involved or asserted in the proceeding.331
Lawyers who represent private parties and public interest groups in agency
proceedings will provide these interested parties with access to relevant
legislative history.33 2
Further, the agency would include analysis of
legislative history as part of its statement of reasons in support of its

decision.333
One might object that notice during the adjudicative process is
insufficient because an order may retroactively impose liability for actions
taken prior to the hearing.334 Still, this concern does not provide a reason
to reject legislative history; the general text of regulatory statutes may be
equally deficient in providing third parties advance notice of their legal
rights and obligations. In Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Cheney
Corp., 335 for example, the SEC issued an order disapproving the
management's purchase of preferred stock in a public utility holding
company during reorganization. 3 6 There was no evidence of fraud, lack of
disclosure, or breach of fiduciary duty based on pre-existing judicial
standards,337 and management was clearly caught off guard by the new
legal standard adopted in the SEC's order.3 38 The management's surprise
was understandable, given the broad statutory language authorizing the
SEC to approve "fair and equitable" reorganization plans. B9 These

331.

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2)-(3) (2012) (calling for reference to "legal authority" and a

description of "issues involved" in notice of proposed rulcmaking); id. § 554 6(b)(2)-(3)
(requiring notice of "legal authority" and matters of "law asserted" before a formal
adjudicatory hcaring).
332. Ross & Tranen, supra note 36, at 236.
333. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ("After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concisc gcncral statement of their basis and
purposc."); see also § 557(c)(A) ("All decisions . .
shall include a statement of . .
findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues or fact, law, or
discretion presented on the record.").
334.

Agency rules do not gcncrally operate retroactively. See, e.g., Bowcn v. Georgetown

Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213, 215 (1988).
335. 332 U.S. (1947).
336. Id. at 198-99.
337. Id. at 197-98.
338. Id. at 203 (permitting the SEC to order compliance with "a new standard of
conduct" despite its "rctroactive effect"); id. at 212-13 (Jackson,J., dissenting) (objecting that
the SEC's order was not supported by prc-cxisting "law or regulation").

339.

Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 § 11(d) (1935). As noted by the Court, the

SEC's underlying order was based on "conclusions from the particular facts in the case, its
gcncral experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of statutory
requirements."

C,/henery, 332 U.S. at 204.

Although the SEC noted some lcgislative history
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capacious statutory terms did not provide private parties notice as to
whether trading during reorganization violated the law.s' 0 In the wake of
Chenery, parties subject to regulatory oversight are on notice that they may
have no advance warning of how an agency would evaluate their conduct
under a broadly-worded statute. If anything, legislative history might be
desirable to add context to the agency's view of statutory obligations.
Further, parties trying to predict how agencies will interpret statutes will
likely be on notice of agency practice. It is routine practice for agencies to
consider legislative history when interpreting a statute.3 41 Indeed, in many
cases agencies were actually involved in the legislative process of amending
the regulatory statute. 342 Lawyers representing parties affected by agency
action also have a professional duty to consider legislative history that may
shape the agency's interpretation of the governing statute.343
Finally, courts adopting a textualist approach on judicial review raises
distinct concerns over lack of notice to agencies and interested parties. As
noted above, textualism enhances uncertainty by raising the possibility that
dual interpretive standards will determine the legality of agency decisions:
the purposive methodology applied by agencies and the textualist
methodology applied by a reviewing judge. Even when textualism does
apply, it is difficult to predict which dictionary definition or canon of
construction will trump in a particular case. 344
For all of these reasons, textualism may make it more difficult to predict
what legal requirements a regulatory statute imposes.
Notice-based
objections do not require a textual approach to interpretation of regulatory
statutes. If anything, use of texualism in the regulatory context raises its
own set of concerns about notice to third parties.
Principles of contract interpretation offer a compelling analogy for

relevant to its gcncral reorganization power, its specific disapproval of management
purchases

focused

on

the SEC's

concern over

potential

conflicts

of interests

and

understanding that the statute does not limit its power to address this concern as an issue of
fairness. In the Matter Of Fed. Water Scrv. Corp. Util. Operators Co. Fed. Water & Gas

Corp., Exchangc Act Release No. 5584, 1945 WL 58953 *17-20 (Feb. 8, 1945).
340.

As Justice Frankfurter noted, "Congress itsclf did not proscribc the respondents'

purchases of preferred stock." Cheney, 318 U.S. at 93.
341.

Strauss, supra note 36, at 329-30 (noting lcgislative history is central and important

to work of agency lawycrs).
342.
343.
344.

See discussion of Zuni, supra notes 245-257 and accompanying text.
Bccrmann, supra note 5; Lawson, supra note 260.
See Picrce, supra note 64, at 765 (noting that "plain meaning" approach could bC

unpredictable because different judges might rely on different sets of dictionary definitions);
see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (demonstrating that there
"are two opposing canons on almost cycry point").
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regulatory statutes. In some cases, overwhelming transaction costs will lead
Congress to use general language in regulatory statutes.345 Contractual
analysis suggests that in such cases it is preferable for courts to tailor their
interpretive analysis along purposive lines. This is not a universal rule,
however. When Congress uses specific language, the interpretive method
should be tailored to prioritize textual meaning. The discussion below
illustrates how contract law's semi-tailored approach would apply to
leading Chevron cases in which regulatory statutes presented different
degrees of specificity.
2. Application to Generally- Worded Regulatory Statutes
A purposive approach recognizes that text will often fail to specify a
single answer to the disputed policy before the court. It counsels against
aggressive readings that insist on deriving a single binding meaning from
judicial canons of construction or a dictionary definition of general
statutory language.34 6 MCI v. AT&Tm4 illustrates how failure to use a
purposive approach can run roughshod over Congress's likely intent to
delegate interpretive flexibility to an agency through general language.
It is highly unrealistic to assume Congress ever anticipated the FCC's
rate-filing exception for competing carriers. When Congress enacted the
Communications Act of 1934,348 it established the FCC and authorized the
FCC to regulate rates charged for communication services "to ensure that
they were reasonable and nondiscriminatory."3 4 ') At that time, AT&T's
vertically integrated Bell system gave it a "virtual monopoly" over
telephone service in the United States.35
One of the Act's mechanisms for regulating rates was the requirement
that AT&T, as a common carrier, charge only rates it had filed with the
FCC.
Section 203(a) requires common carriers to "file with the
Commission . . . schedules showing all charges" for their services.351 But
section 203(b)(2) anticipated that these rate-filing requirements should be
dynamic rather than static. It provided that the "Commission may, in its
discretion and for good cause shown, modify any requirement made by or
under the authority of this section . . . by general order applicable to special
345.

Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 136-37.

346. See infra note 284 (noting the UCC rejects dictionary definitions for contractual
interpretation).

347.
348.

512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).
Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

(2012)).
349.
350.
351.

11CI, 512 U.S. at 220.
Id.
47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012).
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circumstances or conditions."35 2
It was not until the 1970s that advances in technology reduced barriers
to entry and allowed competitors to enter the market for long-distance
telephone service.35 3
The FCC decided that rate-filing requirements
designed to constrain monopoly pricing did not apply to competing
carriers. Given that competing carriers did not exist when Congress passed
the Act, the FCC's power to "modify" original rate-filing requirements in
"special circumstances" seemed to apply.35
But Justice Scalia's majority opinion left no room for the FCC's
understanding or ability to update the law based on changed
circumstances. As noted injustice Stevens's dissent, the majority "seize[d]
upon a particular sense of the word 'modify' at the expense of another,
long-established meaning that fully support[ed] the Commission's
position." 35 5 Scalia's insistence on a narrow understanding of the term
"modify"-derived in key part from select dictionary definitions -specifies
a greater limitation on the FCC than Congress likely considered or
intended when it passed the Communications Act. It flies in the face of
Congress's likely intent to delegate to the FCC power to address changes in
the communications industry.
Further, MCI illustrates that a purposive interpretive approach need not
always tackle divisive questions such as the use of legislative history. The
purposive approach recognizes that general statutory terms have limited
ability to fix specific legal meaning. Judges are not to supply more meaning
than Congress intended through interpretive sources such as dictionaries.35t
The Court could have resolved MCI differently on the sole basis of the
textual meaning of the term "modify." The Court could simply have
deferred to the FCC's interpretation of that general term in accordance
with "long-established meaning" of the word.3 5
Likewise, in Brown
Williamson, the Court could have accepted the broad and literal meaning of
"drugs and devices" 358 without cobbling together a more limited
352. Id. § 203(b) (cmphasis added).
353. MCI. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).
354. See id. at 240 (Stcvcns, J., dissenting) ("From the vantage of a Congress sccking to
regulate an almost completely monopolized industry, the advent of competition is surely a
'special circumstance or condition' that might legitimately call for different regulatory
treatment.").
355. Id. at 241-42.
356. The UCC's soft or purposive approach explicitly rules out dictionary definitions.
See U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (2014).
357.
11CI, 512 U.S. at 241-42 (Stcvcns,J., dissenting).
358. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120, 162 (2000) (Brcycr, J.,
dissenting) (stating "tobacco products (including cigarcttes) fall within the scopc of this
statutory definition, read literally").

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

530

Do NoT DELETE

ADMNISTmITIVEL4VREVIEW

/2
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

[67:3

understanding of the FDA's jurisdiction from subsequently enacted statutes.
There are numerous other cases where the Court deferred to an agency's
interpretation of generally-worded statutory provisions.
For example,
consider the IRS's interpretation that medical residents were not
"students;" 5 1) the EPA's use of cost-benefit proxies to determine otherwise
immeasurable "amounts" of pollution contributed from neighboring
stts() the EPA's consideration of technology's relative costs and
environmental benefits under a "best technology available" standard;361
and the Secretary of Interior's interpretation of "harm" to include habitat
modification which kills endangered species. 3 62 The purposive approach
aligns with a modest judicial role and a presumption of deference whenever
Congress uses open-ended terms. 6 It fulfills Chevron's purpose-"to put a
thumb on the scales in favor of agency interpretations of law." 3 64
3. Application to Specific Language in Regulatory Statutes
Not all statutes contain gaps for agencies to fill. Chevron acknowledges as
much: both courts and agencies must abide by statutory terms when
"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 3 65
Contractual interpretation reflects a similar principle-written contracts
are unlikely to contain gaps when the writing is "long and detailed" or
when it specifically addresses important or disputed contingencies. 3t
Specific language suggests that the drafters valued enforcement of
particular terms and invested resources needed to commit those terms to
writing. When courts face specific statutory language, then, they should
approach it with more reverence and a lesser presumption of deference.
The cases below address how courts might tailor their deference analysis
when faced with specific statutory language. First, uni Public School District
v. Department of Education illustrates problems of a purposive approach that
does not adequately account for specific statutory language. Second, King v.
Burwell provides an example of how specific language invites courts to play
a more active role in identifying meaning. Finally, Justice Breyer's dissent

359.
360.
361.
362.
(1995).

Mayo Found. for Mcd. Educ. & Res., v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 60 (2011).
EPA v. EME Homer City Gencration, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1607 (2014).
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkceper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 225-26 (2009).
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Grcat Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703

363.

Herz, supra note 29, at 200 (finding that rcvicw of an agency's interpretation of a

broadly-worded statute is "narrow . .
because there is so little to interpret").
364. Gersen & Vcrmculc, supra note 21 at 709.

365.
(1984).
366.

Chcvron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
See Posncr, supra note 34, at 535.
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in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA suggests how a textual interpretive
approach may help courts resolve a conflict between specific and general
language in the same statute.
uni Public School District v. Department ofEducation
uni presents a case in which lower transaction costs may have allowed
Congress to draft more specific statutory provisions. 367 In the Impact Aid
Act, Congress specified a formula for the Department of Education to
follow in calculating state-wide school expenditures. In addition to being
specific, these calculations were not perceived as presenting highly
contested political issues. 3 68 Congress may have also been better informed
about the calculations because they had been applied in the past.
Justice Breyer's opinion struggled with the specific language of Impact
Aid. The statute directed the Secretary of Education to "disregard local
educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the
95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures or revenues
in the State.",3t 6
The Secretary instead calculated ninety-fifth and fifth
percentiles by ranking expenditures based on the proportion of the state's
population included in a particular district.s37
Although Justice Breyer's purposive reading ultimately allowed the
Secretary's decision to stand, his opinion began by focusing on
"[c]onsiderations other than language." 3 7 1 Only after reviewing extratextual considerations did Justice Breyer examine the statutory language
and determine that it was ambiguous. Justice Breyer failed to account for
specific statutory language. His opinion repeatedly paraphrased the key
term "local educational agency," 3 72 and it failed to adequately explain why
the statute expressly noted this population rather than the weighted
population used by the Secretary.3
Justice Breyer's failure to account for specific statutory provisions did not
attract broad support on the Court. 3 4 SixJustices expressed concern with
Justice Breyer's approach. Justices Kennedy and Alito agreed that the Act

367.
368.
accused
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007).
Id. at 106 (Stcycns, J., concurring) (stating he could not imaginc Justices being
of voting their "own policy preferences").
20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 90.
See id. at 94 (paraphrasing the statute instead to read "local school districts').
,uni, 550 U.S. 81, 94 (2007).
Only Justicc Ginsburg joined his opinion without writing separately. Id. at 83.
Justice Stcycns's concurrence openly disclaimed any need to account for the statutc's "literal
application." Id. at 104-05 (Stcycns,J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was ambiguous, but their concurrence questioned justice Breyer's emphasis
on "policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools of statutory
construction."375 Part I of Justice Scalia's dissent, which was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Souter, asserted that
Impact Aid unambiguously required percentiles to be calculated based on
per-pupil expenditures of local educational agencies.3@ Thus, the dissent
argued the Secretary's decision should have been invalidated under Step
One of Chevron.
Breyer's failure to attract a broader coalition may reflect the difficulty of
applying an overly deferential approach to agency interpretations that
contradict specific statutory language.
uni was not the typical Chevron case
in which the Court faced an agency interpretation of a generally-worded
statute. Beyond discord over interpretive method, uni shows that specific
statutory terms make it difficult to adopt a strong presumption of deference.
An overly permissive purposive approach may overlook the fact that
Congress supplied a precise answer to the policy dispute.
King v. Burwell
Specific language can also help explain why Justices interpreted the
Affordable Care Act de novo in King v. Burwell. To be sure, ChiefJustice
Roberts viewed King as an extraordinary case that was not subject to
Chevron.3 77 In King, however, the ACA's text and structure provided
relatively specific evidence of meaning.
The Chief Justice made sense of the ACA in light of overarching
structure. As he noted, the ACA requires three "interlocking reforms" to
sustain broader health insurance coverage. 3 8 First, the ACA bars insurers
from refusing to cover persons based on preexisting medical conditions.79
Second, it requires all individuals to purchase health insurance or make a
payment to the IRS.38() Third, the ACA gives low- to moderate-income
381
people tax credits to help them afford insurance.
In King, the dispute focused on provisions of the ACA requiring
establishment of an "Exchange," or marketplace that allows people to
purchase insurance plans, in each State.382 If a State chooses not to

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at
Id. at
King
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

107 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
111-12 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
2485.

2 CHABOT POSTPROOF

Do NoT DELETE

2015]

/2
8:49PMI
9/2/2015

SELLING CHEVRON

533

establish its own Exchange, the federal government will do so instead.383
Thus, the Court had to decide whether the ACA permitted the IRS to
extend ACA's tax credits to States with federally-run Exchanges.384
As noted above, the majority decided this question without deferring to
the IRS. 385 The Court based its interpretation on the ACA's specific
instructions for tax credits, the manner in which these instructions
interacted with other requirements of the ACA, and the ACA's broader
structure and purpose. Section 36B of Internal Revenue Code contains
specific instructions for tax credits. This section allows eligible taxpayers to
receive a "premium assistance credit amount." 38 t
The credit amount
reflects "monthly premiums for . . . qualified health plans . . . which were
enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State under [42 U.S.C.
§ 18,031]."387 As the majority noted, when viewed in isolation, the phrase
"established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18,031]" suggests that credits
388
are available only for insurance purchased on state-run Exchanges.
When the Court considered this language in context, however, it
doubted that Congress intended to limit credits in this manner.3 8') For
example, the ACA gives States the option to establish an Exchange under
§ 18,031. If a State fails to do so, however, § 18,041 directs the federal
government to step into the State's shoes: The federal government must
establish and operate "such Exchange within the State."sso Further, the
ACA establishes "qualified individuals" who are eligible to purchase
insurance on exchanges, and provides that these individuals must "resid[e]
in the State that established the Exchange."9 1
If the federally-run
exchanges do not count as state-run Exchanges, States with federally-run
exchanges would have no qualified individuals.392 The majority found that
this outcome would make no sense, given the ACA's fundamental
requirement that all Exchanges offer "qualified health plans to qualified

383.
384.
385.

King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 2488-89; see Part II.B(2).

386.

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2012).

387.

Id. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (cmphasis added).

388.

King, 135 S. Ct. 2489.

389. King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). Despite the majority's rejection of
Chevron, its consideration of other parts the Act lcd only to the conclusion that the text of the
Act was "ambiguous." Id. at 2490-92. The majority assigned meaning based on the
"broader structurc" or purpose of the Act. Id. at 2492-93.
390. Id. at 2489 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18,041(c)(1) (2012)).

391.

42 U.S.C. § 18,032(f)(1)(A)(ii).

392. This is becausc residents of a state with a federally-run exchange would not live in
the "State that established the Exchangc" under § 18032(f)(1)(a)(ii). King, 135 S. Ct. 2490.
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individuals.
The majority identified several other parts of the Act that would make
better sense if federally-run exchanges were treated as equivalent to staterun exchanges.3 94
The Court also rejected an argument that this
interpretation would render specific language of § 36B surplusage.s95 In
King, the canon against surplusage required unfair assumptions about the
precision with which the Affordable Care Act was drafted: the ACA
contained several examples of "inartful drafting" that seemed to have been
passed without the "care and deliberation" one would expect.36 Finally,
the majority held that denial of tax credits would be inconsistent with the
ACA's overall design. An allowance for tax credits preserved the ACA's
fundamental requirement that sufficient numbers of people purchase health

insurance. 397
In his dissent, Justice Scalia condemned the majority's interpretation of
the ACA.
Justice Scalia contended that specific language in § 36B
controlled and precluded tax credits for federally-run exchanges.3 98 He
also disagreed that § 36B had a different meaning when considered
alongside the rest of the Affordable Care Act."' Justice Scalia went on to
chastise the majority for considering the ACA's purpose and for pursuing a
single purpose without accounting for the alternative statutory goal"encouraging state involvement" in implementing the ACA.400
He
concluded that the majority changed the "usual rules of statutory
interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act" and that the ACA
ought to be renamed "SCOTUScare."4 0o1
Much of the Justices' dispute focused on how much emphasis to place on
different provisions in the ACA's detailed scheme for health insurance

393.

Id.

394. Id. at 2490-92 (cxplaining other provisions in the Act require all Exchanges to
disseminate information about availability of tax credits, assist persons in calculation of tax
credits, and report to the Trcasury Secretary payments of tax credits); id. at 2494-95 (stating
it was unlikely Congress would have buried a major exception to the Act's reforms in dctails
of tax credit calculation under section 36B).

395.

King v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).

396.

Id. In other words, the Court recognized that the Act was far from poetry.

397.

Id. at 2492-93.

As explained by ChicfJusticc Roberts, a plan which allowed

cycryone to obtain hcalth insurance but did not mandate coverage would inducc only the
very sick to purchase insurance. Id. 2485. This adversc selection would cause insurance
premiums to skyrocket and create a "dcath spiral" pursuant to which fewer and fewer
peoplc wanted to purchase hcalth insurance. Id. at 2493.

398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
King

2494-98.
2497-502.
2504.
v. Bunvcll, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506-07 (2015).
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reform. 402 King did not require justices to derive particular meaning from a
broadly-worded statute. Instead, the Justices sorted out conflicting terms in
a series of complicated and interlocking health insurance reforms. This
complex legal determination presented a matter fit for judicial resolution.
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgeng
Textualist principles can also help judges reconcile conflicts between
general and specific language in the same statute. In Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, the Clean Air Act (CAA) required permits for major
stationary emitters of "any air pollutant," while specifying numeric
thresholds (100-250 tons of yearly air pollutant emissions) to trigger permit
requirements. 40)3 As noted above, applying both of these provisions at face
value would be problematic as applied to sources emitting greenhouse
gases.
The CAA's numerical thresholds for permits were reasonable for other
air pollutants but very low for greenhouse gas emissions.
Thus, if
greenhouse gases were considered "air pollutants," the CAA's statutory
thresholds would require millions of new permits without significant
environmental benefits. 4 04 The EPA responded by following the CAA's
general command (regulate "any air pollutant") but relaxed specific
commands (numeric permit thresholds), which did not make sense when
applied to greenhouse gas.
Neither the EPA nor any Justice argued for an interpretation giving
effect to both the general and specific provisions of the CAA. Justice
Scalia's solution was to narrow the meaning of the general command
greenhouse gas could not be considered an air pollutant. 405 He argued that
the CAA's structure showed that the category of regulated air pollutants
was limited to "a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering
4
heavy substantive and procedural burdens."s
oa But this understanding
seems grounded in fear of dire policy consequences rather than necessary
implication of the CAA's plain language. A strict textual reading could give
effect to all of the CAA's provisions and impose vast permitting
requirements for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.
Justice Breyer's dissent offered a different solution, which should have
been equally acceptable to textualists. Textualists do not apply statutory

402.
403.
404.

Id. at 2492-93.
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (2014).
Id. at 2436-39.

405. Id. at 2441 (stating that "what is meant" by Congress in this case "is obviously
narrower").

406.

Id. at 2443.
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terms literally, and textualist judges sometimes ease literal meaning to avoid
an absurd result.07 Justice Breyer noted these absurdity concerns in Utility
Air. No one wanted the absurd result of applying both provisions to achieve
extremely burdensome permit requirements that do not actually improve
air quality.408
To resolve the issueJustice Breyer proposed an implied exception to the
CAA's specific requirements: the statute could generally be understood to
regulate "any source with the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons per
year or more of any air pollutant." 4()) This general rule would exclude
sources emitting small amounts of greenhouse cases "to which regulation at that
threshold would be impractical or absurd." 4 o Justice Breyer defended this
411
proposed limitation based on the CAA's purpose and legislative history.
But the limitation could also be explained as allowing textualist
methodology and the absurd results exception-to provide a helpful
interpretation of specific language.
4. Objections to the PurposiveApproach's Presumption ofDeference
Applying a purposive interpretive approach to generally-worded
regulatory statutes would no doubt draw objections. Deference could lead
judges to affirm agency policy choices to which the enacting Congress
would never have agreed. 412 The specter of such error has haunted the
Court in high-stake cases such as Brown & Williamson.4 13
Questions of error implicate seemingly intractable debates over

407. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 243 ("Justice Scalia has endorsed the absurd
results exception.").

408.
409.
410.

Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2452 (Brcycr,J., dissenting).
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2452-53 (2014).
Id. (cmphasis in original).

411. Id. at 2453-55. Justice Brcycr has also argued lcgislative history can hclp judges
decide whether a statutory provision should bC considered absurd. Brcycr, supra note 69, at

848-49.
412. Posncr notes this type of crror is possible when courts apply the soft approach. See
Posncr, supra note 34, at 542.
413. The majority refused to allow regulation of tobacco products and opined that
"Congress could not have intended to dccgate a decision of such cconomic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion." FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
120, 160 (2000). Justice Scalia cchocd this sentiment in cases such as American Trucking and
Utility Air. In American Tricking, the Court refused to construc an alleged ambiguity in the
CAA as permitting the EPA to consider costs of regulation without more clear instruction

from Congress.

531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Even more dramatically, in Utility Air, Justice

Scalia refused to construc a sweeping grant of regulatory authority as allowing the EPA to
require millions of new permits without clear congressional authorization.
134 S. Ct. at

2444.
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comparative institutional advantage and what method of statutory
interpretation will keep judges more faithful to the drafters' true intentions.
The divide over interpretive method pervades both contractual 14 and
statutory interpretation. 415 To be sure, not all textualist arguments in
statutory interpretation can be reduced to concerns over accuracy. But
constitutional objections to consideration of legislative history41t extend
beyond judicial review to questions of whether legislative history is a
legitimate source of meaning for agencies. Constitutional objections also do
not reach other interpretive problems such as how aggressively or modestly
one should read statutory text. Accuracy of interpretation, on the other
hand, presents a core objection, which must be addressed in any helpful
understanding of Chevron.
Any understanding of interpretive error must recognize the fact that
neither interpretive method will be error free. One must account for two
different types of error. As noted in contractual interpretation, under a soft
parol evidence rule, "courts err by enforcing extra-contractual statements"
to which parties never actually agreed.41
Under a hard parol evidence
rule, the "characteristic error . . . is the court's refusal to enforce
statements ... which are part of the contract, even if not part of the
writing."4 18
The same concerns hold true in the regulatory context. For example,
the majority in Brown & Williamson was worried about erroneously
affirming tobacco regulations to which Congress had not agreed.l') But it
may have committed the other type of error-failure to recognize health
protection Congress did delegate (or at least assume the risk of delegating) to
the FDA through general language. This error would also come at great
cost, as it would deny safety and health benefits of FDA regulation over

414.

Compare Arthur L. Corbin, The Inteipretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50

CORNELL L.Q 161, 162-63 (1965) (asserting extrinsic evidence hclps a court fulfill its duty
to "put itself 'in the shoes' of the partics" at the time the contract was madc), with 3 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & GEORGEJ. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE L4W OF CONTRACTS 1819-22

(rcv. cd. 1936) (cxpressing fear that false or unrcliable parol evidence would misicad jurics).
415. There is a massive literature dcbating the preferred approach to statutory
interpretation. For a synopsis of competing views, compare Brcycr, supra note 69, at 861
(arguing that purposive approach allows judges to better approximate legislative intent), with
Scalia, supra note 209, at 17 (stating textualism reduces judicial discretion to ensure a
"govcrnment of laws, not of men").
416. See Manning, supra note 262, 698-99 (1997) (discussing constitutional arguments
based on bicameralism and presentment and nondclcgation); Gluck, supra note 237, at
1763-64 (summarizing constitutional bases for textualism).
417. Posncr, supra note 34, at 542.
418. Id. at 543.
419. See 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
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tobacco products everyone agreed were dangerous.
As noted above, there is no consensus as to which interpretive method
will best limit judicial error, or which institution (agencies or courts) are less
likely to err. In contract law, error is not a freestanding concern but a
function of how much a party values enforcement of terms in her
contract.42() Error in enforcing terms of a real estate contract presents a
greater concern than error in enforcing terms of a contract to buy an
inexpensive consumer good. 421
Thus, courts might apply different
interpretive approaches to contracts for sales of consumer goods and real
estate. 422 For regulatory statutes, general language suggests Congress did
not value specific enforcement enough to direct the agency's policy
choice; 4 2 3 instead, it delegated the question to an agency. 424
For regulatory statutes, moreover, one should not overlook institutional
considerations suggesting that different errors impose different costs. 4 25 An
erroneous denial of regulatory authority is harder to undo than an
erroneous decision permitting regulation. A court erroneously vacating an
agency's interpretation under Step One imposes not only an incorrect
reading of a statute, but one that carries the weight of stare decisis. 42t This
error would require further legislation or overruling of precedent to be
changed.
A court that erroneously validates an agency's interpretation of a statute,
on the other hand, does not have the last word over the agency's policy
choice. It leaves the agency's interpretation open to agency revision based
on political pressure from Congress and the President, both of whom are
more electorally accountable than federal judges. 42 7 To be sure, revising a
rule may present its own set of difficulties for an agency. And the added
political accountability offers a second best outcome, as the agency's views
will likely be shaped by currently governing political forces rather than the
views of the enacting Congress. Nevertheless, this outcome offers a greater

420. Posncr, supra note 34, at 567 ('Judicial accuracy is not independently valuablc; it is
valuable only to the extent that it increases the value of contracts.").

421.
422.

Id. at 554-55.
Id.

423.

Spence & Cross, supra note 40, at 135-36.

424.

Id.

425.
426.

This point is distinct from dcbate over which institution is less likely to crr.
See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Scrvs., 545 U.S. 967, 989

(2005).
427.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Coip., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Brcycr, J.,
dissenting) (stating the "decision to regulate tobacco" is onc "for which that administration,
and those politically clected officials who support it, must (and will) take responsibility");
Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 79, at 243 (cxplaining that agencies offer accountability and
expertise on most important political questions).
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degree of flexibility and accountability than a judicial determination to limit
the meaning of a statute.
What is more, courts wishing to check excessive agency policy decisions
also have lower-cost options than Chevron. Legal review of an agency's
statutory interpretation is only one standard of review available to the
courts. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review allows courts to
consider, among other things, whether the agency "entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem" or "relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider."4 28 This standard allows a court
to remand an issue to the agency for further consideration, rather than
imposing a categorical ban on its policy decision as a matter of statutory

construction.

429

Thus, while concerns over error are legitimate, they do not dictate a
single interpretive method under Chevron. A rule designed to systematically
limit agency enforcement should not be considered free of concerns over
error, especially given Congress's strong incentives to delegate choices to
agencies using general language. Failure to leave room for an agency's
policy decision may be just as problematic as failure to check an agency
action.
In contract law, courts have accommodated competing interpretive
frameworks with a semi-tailored approach. Differences in interpretive
methodology may be understood to reflect parties' differing incentives to
draft a complete and unambiguous expression of their final agreement. To
be sure, courts do not have the ability to weigh incentives and customize
interpretive approaches to every case. 4 o Still, the ability to use a semitailored interpretive approach suggests some helpful rules of thumb that
courts may apply to regulatory statutes.
When a statute administered by an agency contains broad or general

428. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41, 43 (1983) (authorizing judicial review of "arbitrary" and "capricious"
agency decisions).
429. Id. at 41, 43, 57 In Michgan v. EPA, for examplc, the Supreme Court found it
unrcasonable for the EPA to issue preliminary power plant regulations without considering
cost as an "important aspect of the problem." Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07
(2015). The Court gave the EPA lecway to dcterminc "how to account for cost" on remand.
Id. at 2711-12. Further, in rcycrsing the D.C. Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court
remanded the cases to that circuit without vacating the EPA's underlying rules. Id. The
D.C. Circuit may remand without vacatur and allow the EPA to keep its rules intact while
the agency reconsiders costs of regulation. Lisa Heinzcrling, Michigan v. EPA: Costs Alatter,
But Everything Else is [p Jor Grabs, AM. CONST Soc'Y BLOG June 29, 2015),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/michigan-v-cpa-costs-matter-but-ccrything-clsc-is-up-forgrabs.
430. Posncr, supra note 34, at 547-48.
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language, it is unrealistic to assume Congress bound the agency to a
particular policy choice. Courts reviewing interpretations of generallyworded regulatory statutes can reflect Congress's incentives by adopting a
purposive interpretive framework. The purposive framework acknowledges
statutory text will often be insufficient to address the policy question
resolved by the agency.
This presumption should not extend, however, to cases where Congress
passed a statute containing more specific language. While this line may not
always be easy to draw, it is a concept that judges can apply without
difficulty in many cases. A very general definition or standard is not the
same as a specific formula directing the agency how to make a particular
calculation. At the very least, the distinction should make courts pause
before insisting that vague language "clearly" requires a particular
regulatory outcome.
B. ContractLaw Suggests Areas of Interpretive Compromise
Whenever a judge reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute, under
Chevron or any other standard, she must ultimately determine the meaning
of the underlying statute. This task invites disagreement over interpretive
The unresolved debate over interpretive method persists in
method.4 1
both Chevron cases and larger questions of statutory interpretation.
As noted above, judges do not need to choose a single interpretive
method for all cases. They could tailor their interpretive approach, using
purposive methodology for generally-worded statutory provisions and
textualist methodology where statutory language is more specific. But this
semi-tailored approach would still present obstacles for some judges.
Justice Breyer would probably be reluctant to approach specific statutory
terms with a textualist methodology, and Justice Scalia would no doubt
vehemently resist a purposive interpretation of general statutory terms.
These problems are not hopeless. Even on the Supreme Court, there
are Justices who might embrace a more flexible approach.
Justices
Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito, for example, have not adopted absolutist
objections to consideration of legislative history.432 And, in practice, even
committed textualists and purposivists have areas of overlap and
agreement. Purposivists still prioritize specific textual requirements over
other evidence. Justice Breyer's discussion of the absurdity canon of
construction in Utility Air4 33 invoked an argument amenable to textualists as
well as purposivists. Textualists, on the other hand, may not be as opposed
431.
432.
433.

See, e.g., supra note 26.
Gluck, States as Laboratories,supra note 237, at 1831-32.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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to modest readings of statutory language as use of legislative history.
Further, Justice Scalia has expressly endorsed consideration of agency
4
practice in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.4 3
Consensus seems within even closer reach for federal court of appeals
and district court judges. The cases these judges decide are often less
controversial than cases decided by the Supreme Court. In addition,
empirical studies suggest that court of appeals judges are predisposed to
find reasons to agree, even when their panel contains ideologically distant
colleagues. 435 District court judges who fear reversal may also prefer
interpretive methods with potential to appease appellate judges applying
different interpretive approaches. The discussion below describes areas of
potential compromise and then introduces the UCC as an interpretive
framework that could facilitate such compromise.
Scholars addressing the debate over statutory interpretation have begun
to identify possibilities for compromise. Textualism and purposivism have
more in common than one might think, and Jonathan Molot points out
that both approaches "place great weight on statutory text and look beyond
text to context." 3
He argues that the primary difference between
textualists and non-textualists is willingness to consider legislative history,
and that in many cases this difference will not point to different
outcomes. 43 7
Abbe Gluck identifies a modified textualism, which has taken hold in
several states.
Modified textualism diverges from original textualism
applied by Justices such as Scalia in two key respects. 438 First, modified
textualism "ranks interpretive tools in a clear order."43 9 Second, "it
includes legislative history in the hierarchy."44 o Judges, then, are to
consider different interpretive tools in tiers--"textual analysis, then
legislative history, then default judicial presumptions."4 4 1
While the
modified approach will not appeal to textualist purists,44 2 Gluck identifies
how it still meets important goals of textualism. It offers formality designed
to limit judicial discretion and allows textual analysis priority over all other
factors.443

434.

556 U.S. 208, 224 (2009).

435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Scc Cross & Tiller,JudicialPartisanship,
supra note 72, at 2171-72.
Molot, supra note 25, at 3.
Id. at 38.
Gluck, States as Laboratories,supra note 237, at 1758.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1829.

441.
442.
443.
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While modified textualism has had some success at the state level,4 4 4 its

framework seems less helpful for regulatory statutes. States using a tiered
approach limit their initial inquiry to traditional textualist sources and open
the analysis to legislative history or other sources only if the text is not
clear.4 4 5 This approach seems to re-hash problems in the current version of

Chevron. It uses a clarity/ambiguity framework and prompts courts to
derive clear meaning from statutory text without regard to how general or
specific its language is. These presumptions are ill suited to generallyworded federal regulatory statutes.
This Article proposes the UCC's parol evidence rule as an alternative
compromise framework. The Code offers a purposive framework capable
of accommodating generally-worded regulatory statutes. At the same time,
the Code recognizes the need to defer to specific textual provisions and
acknowledge a hierarchy of interpretive sources. The Code's interpretive
rules have been widely adopted and are currently the law governing
transactions in the sale of goods in every state except Louisiana.44t The
discussion below outlines the Code's compromise approach and then
describes how it might be applied in the Chevron context.
1. The UCC's Compromise Interpretive Approach
The Code's parol evidence rule generally aligns with the soft parol
evidence rule outlined above. 447 Karl Llewellyn, the principal architect of
UCC Articles 1 and 2,448 crafted § 2-202 in response to courts'
unpredictable application of the hard parol evidence rule.44 ') Llewellyn
believed that "legal rules themselves should reflect the actual practices of
those they were designed to regulate."45 () The hard parol evidence rule
failed to account for the "frequency with which vital terms of oral
negotiations are in fact omitted from (or not reduced to) a formal

444. Gluck, States as Laboratories,supra note 237, at 1771-1815.
445. See, e.g., id. at 1777 (noting Orcgon's practice of considering lcgislative history only if
"textual aids do not achicyc clarity").
446. "Article 2 has been adopted in cycry state except Louisiana." Why States Should
Adopt UCC Article 2A, UNIF. L. COMM'N http: / /www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?titlc=
Why%20Statcs%2OShould%20Adopt%20UCC%20Articlc%202A
(last visited Aug. 8,
2015). Most states adopted the UCC's parol evidence rule (§ 2-202) without revision, and a
handful of states adopted it with minor revisions, but this does not alter the analysis in this
paper. See U.C.C. Local Code Variations § 2-202 (Sept. 2013).
447. Scc supra Part III.A.
448. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 278-300
(Robert Stcycns ct al. cds., 1973).
449. Brcen, supra note 36, at 296.
450. Id. at 308.
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writing."4 51 At the same time, Llewellyn recognized a need to exclude
"prior or contemporaneous modifying terms" for agreements "drawn under
advice of counsel" or "made wholly by correspondence." 4 52 The Code's
parol evidence rule attempts to account for writings with varying degrees of
completeness.
The UCC rejects assumptions that parties will specify all terms of their
agreement. In general, Article 2 assumes parties will often agree on sales of
goods without nailing down significant terms such as those reflecting price
and delivery.453 Section 1-201(3) also provides a contextual definition of
"agreement," which means "the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in
their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of dealing, or
usage of trade."4 54
Thus, rather than requiring exclusive reliance on text unless it is shown
to be ambiguous, the UCC approach requires courts to automatically
consider reliable non-textual evidence alongside express written terms.
Courts also have an obligation to construe both textual and non-textual
forms of evidence as "consistent with each other" "whenever
reasonable."4 5 5 Further, courts are directed to be modest in interpreting
written terms-the UCC approach eschews dictionary definitions and
canons of construction that might imbue general terms with more meaning
than their drafters intended.4 5t Finally, the Code provides a hierarchy for
comparing express contractual terms to other evidence of meaning.457 This
hierarchy favors textual evidence because express terms trump all other
evidence where express terms cannot reasonably be construed in a manner
consistent with evidence such as course of dealing or usage of trade.458
Under the UCC, the primary question is whether an express term is
specific enough to render course of dealing or trade usage "inconsistent." A

451. Karl N. Llewellyn, I hat Pice Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yalc LJ. 740, 747
(1931).
452. Id.
453. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2012) (stating that a contract will not fail for indefiniteness due
to open terms); id. § 2-305 (open price term); id. § 2-308 (absence of specified place for
dclivery).
454. id. 1-201(b)(3) (cmphasis added).
455. id. § 1-303(c).
456. Id. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (rejecting "lay-dictionary" reading of a commercial agreement);
id. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b) (rejecting meaning derived from "rules of construction existing in the
law").
457. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 7.13 (3d cd. 2004)
("The Code establishes a hicrarchy in which express terms prevail over course of dealing,
usage, and course of performance.").
458. U.C.C. § 1-303(c).
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leading case, Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.,45 9 illustrates that express
terms may require a high level of specificity to displace non-textual
evidence. This dispute centered on a contract in which Columbia Nitrogen
initially agreed to buy certain quantities of phosphate (a fertilizer product)
from Royster, but then refused to make these purchases after the market for
fertilizer plummeted. 4 0
Over the course of the past six years, Columbia had on several occasions
sold fertilizer products to Royster, but Columbia had rarely purchased
Royster's products. Columbia recounted these contracts were marked by
"repeated and substantial deviation from the stated amount or price,
including four instances where Royster took none of the goods for which it
had contracted." 4 6 1 The disputed provisions detailed agreements on "base
price, escalation, minimum tonnage, and delivery schedules." The court
held this language was not specific to the contingency at issue here-the
contract was "silent about adjusting prices and quantities to reflect a
declining market." 4 62 Thus the Court allowed evidence of course of dealing
and trade usage (reflecting deviations from stated quantities and prices) to
be considered as evidence of the parties' agreement.4 36
Nevertheless, the UCC contemplates that written terms govern if they
are sufficiently definite. 4 64
Comment 2 to § 2-202 allows parties to
"carefully negate" meanings created by course of dealing, trade usage, and
course of performance. In Royster, a contract term specifically excluding the
parties' particular course of dealing would have undoubtedly governed the
dispute.465
Under the UCC, moreover, non-textual evidence does not receive equal
weight. Section 2-202's general assumption is that terms "set forth in a
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
4
agreement . . . may be explained or supplemented."6
6
But it also limits
supplemental or explanatory evidence to (a) "course of dealing," "usage of
459. 451 F.2d 3, 9 (4th Cir. 1971).
460. Id. at 6-7.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Id at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-11.
U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2012) (cxplaining that a "carefully negated" course of

dealing, trade usage, and course of performance may not become an "clcment of meaning"
of the contract).

465.

Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting the

contract "did not expressly state that course of dealing and trade usage cannot bc used");
FARNSWORTH, supra 457, at § 7.13 (cmphasizing that Royster "stopped short" of saying
whether a gcncral disclaimer of course of dealing or trade usage would be sufficient, and
partics would bc required to negate the particular course of dealing at issuc).

466.

U.C.C. § 2-202 (cmphasis added).
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trade," or "course of performance"4 67 and (b) "evidence of consistent
additional terms." 4 68
Section 202 excludes contradictory prior or
contemporaneous agreements to additional terms.
Unlike course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage, courts have no obligation
to attempt to construe agreements to additional terms as consistent
whenever reasonable. 4 60
Prior or contemporaneous agreements to
additional terms fall at the bottom of the UCC's interpretive hierarchy.
This hierarchy reflects the fact that some forms of non-textual evidence
are inherently more reliable than others. For example, course of dealing,
course of performance, and usage of trade are based on objectively
observable behavior. Respectively, they reflect a "sequence of conduct"
between parties, 4 70 parties' performance under a current contract,4 1 and a
"practice or method of dealing having ... regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade." 4 72 These behaviors are difficult for one party to
manufacture unilaterally in order to escape contractual obligations. Thus,
they generally offer reliable evidence of parties' intent, and it makes sense
for them to receive greater weight as part of the parties' agreement.
The UCC excludes less reliable types of extrinsic evidence. A key
concern with parol evidence is that some parties may use evidence of earlier
negotiations to raise dishonest or erroneous claims as to terms of the
agreement. 4 73 This is most likely to manifest itself in testimony where one
party unilaterally claims a prior agreement 4 74 to terms that differ from those
in the final writing. Unilateral evidence of additional terms is definitively
excluded by § 2-202's parol evidence. 4 75 Such evidence may not be used to

467. U.C.C. § 2-202(a). Comment 1(c) to § 2-202 discourages courts from limiting their
scarch for meaning to plain language of a writing, and expressly rejects the "requirement"
that a court find that "the language used is ambiguous" before admitting evidence of course
of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance. Id. § 2-202 cmt. 1(c).
468. Id. § 2-202(b). Consistent additional terms are also excluded if the agreement is
integrated. Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Counse of Dealing: Subvesion of UCC Theory, 1977
U. ILL. L.F. 811, 816 (1977) (stating "Scction 2-202 provides a rule for excluding three types
of evidencc: contradictory prior agreements, contradictory contemporancous oral
agreements, and consistent additional terms if the agreement is integrated" and "contains no
exclusionary language applicable to evidence of usage of trade or course of dealing").
469. Compare U.C.C. § 1-303(c), with id. § 2-202.
470. U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (2014).
471. Id. § 1-303(a)(1).
472. Id. § 1-303(c).
473. Judge Kozinski famously complained that California's liberal parole evidence rulc
requires courts to divinc partics' intentions from "slf-scrving testimony offered by partisan
witnesses." Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
474. For contemporancous oral agreement, see U.C.C. § 2-202.
475. A consistent additional term may also be excluded if the agreement is integrated.
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contradict terms contained in a writing "intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement." 4 76
As with states' modified textualism, the UCC's interpretive method will
not appeal to purists like Justice Scalia. The Code's approach seems even
more objectionable to textualists; it is not tiered and requires judges to
weigh textual and non-textual evidence together at the first level of analysis.
Nevertheless, its hierarchy has more structure than an open-ended
purposive approach. Specific express terms trump inconsistent evidence of
course of dealing and trade usage, and reliable forms of non-textual
evidence also trump less reliable forms.
2. Application of the Code's InterpretiveMethod to Regulatory Statutes
The UCC structures purposive analysis to prioritize specific text and
objective non-textual evidence of meaning.
This Article has already
discussed problems of failing to prioritize specific textual commands. 1 1
The discussion below explores how the UCC's interpretive principles may
help identify objective, non-textual evidence of statutory meaning.
The UCC prioritizes three types of reliable non-textual evidence, which
are based on objective evidence of parties' or market participants' actions.
Two of these categories, course of performance and course of dealing,
involve sequences of "conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction."47 8 They are comparable to some forms of legislative history
based on official actions taken by Congress and agencies as part of the
legislative process.
In uni, for example, had the amended statute used more general
language, the Code's interpretive principles would support the Court's use
of legislative history. The Court relied on actions that were objectively
inconsistent with an understanding that statutory amendments were
designed to displace the Secretary of Education's existing calculations. The
amendments stemmed from draft legislation provided by the Secretary
himself,44 7 without Congress or the agency discussing a change to the
Secretary's existing method of calculation. 4 80) These actions may not rise to
a sequence of conduct, as required by the UCC,481 but they do bear some

See id.; Kirst, supra note 468, at 816.

476.

U.C.C. § 2-202 (2012).
See supra part III.A.3 (discussing Zuni Public School District No. 89
Education, 550 U.S. 81 (2007)).
477.
478.

U.C.C. §1-303(a)-(b).

479.
480.

,uni, 550 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2007) (cmphasis added).
Id.

481.

U.C.C. §1-303.

v.

Department qf
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of the same indicia of objective reliability. These are not actions one would
expect to accompany legislation changing the Secretary's longstanding
rules.
The Code also recognizes a third category of evidence, trade usage,
which is not limited to conduct by parties that drafted the contract. Trade
usage is a "practice or method of dealing having . .. regularity of
observance in a place, vocation, or trade so as to justify an expectation that
it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."48 2 It may
also be embodied in a "trade code." 483 Evidence of a regularly observed
practice provides objectively verifiable evidence of what participants in the
relevant industry have done in the past.
Agency practice may offer similar assurances of objective, verifiable
evidence. It is evidence of past conduct that cannot be manufactured and
which also has not proved problematic enough for Congress to displace it
through appropriation bills, oversight hearings, or new legislation.48 4
To be clear, this point is not intended to undermine Chevron's dynamism
and argue that agencies are bound to follow their past practice in every
case. 485 Instead, the point is that in some cases agency practice may have a
beneficial defensive use. It may offer reliable evidence supporting an
agency's continuation of a particular policy.
The Court's 2009 decision in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council48 illustrates how agency practice may aid court's Chevron
analysis. 48
Here, conservation groups challenged a permit the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted to a gold-mining company under the
Clean Water Act (CWA). They argued the Corps permit for discharge of
mining waste, in the form of fill material, was inconsistent with arguably
overlapping EPA regulations calling for a permit from the EPA.488 The
Court found the CWA "ambiguous" on this question48 ) and deferred to the
agencies' "reasonable decision to continue their prior practice" of allocating
4
fill material discharge permits to the Corps. 90
The Court found that both the agencies' "published statements" and

482. U.C.C. § 1-303 (c) (2012).
483. Id.
484. Eskridgc & Bacr, The Continuum ofDeference, supra note 4, at 1151.
485. An agency's initial interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering is
not "carved in stone." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 863 (1984).
486. 557 U.S. 261(2009).
487. Id.
488. Id. at 266.
489. Id. at 281.
490. Id. at 291.
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regulatory actions established a practice of allocating fill material discharge
permits to the Corps. Petitioners could not cite even one instance where
the EPA applied applicable standards to a discharge of fill material. Coeur
Alaska, by contrast, pointed out two instances where the Corps issued a
permit to a mine wishing to discharge fill material.4 91
Justice Kennedy's analysis and use of agency practice gained support
from a wide range ofJustices. His opinion was joined not only by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, but also by Justice
Breyer, 492 and in material part by Justice Scalia.93
Justice Scalia
additionally expressly endorsed consideration of agency practice in Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Jnc. 494 There, he took as helpful but not "conclusive" the
fact that "the agency has been proceeding in essentially [the same] fashion
for over 30 years." 495
Thus, some types of legislative history and agency practice can offer
reliable evidence to supplement a court's understanding of a generallyworded statute. The UCC suggests criteria courts may use to distinguish
evidence of past conduct from less reliable evidence based on words. For
example, courts should discount legislators' self-serving statements that do
"not reflect the ultimate deals entered to get the statute through
Congress.""4 ')
This does not require judges to categorically rule out
consideration of legislative history in other cases.
CONCLUSION

Critiques of the Chevron framework are well grounded.
They may
nevertheless be lost on the Supreme Court. In its recent decisions, the
Court chose to plow forward with an inconsistently applied Chevron
framework.91 This inconsistency poses problems for Chevron's proponents,
491.

Id. at 290-91.

492. Justice Brcycr wrote a separate concurrence to cmphasizc the reasonablcncss of the
agency interpretations, which incorporated safcguards to ensure that there was not a
loophole excusing whole categorics of regulated industry from pollution control standards.
Id. at 293-94. Justices Ginsburg, Stcycns, and Souter dissented on the ground that these
safcguards were not adcquate. Id. at 296-97.
493. In his concurrence,Justice Scalia took exception only to the understanding that the
Court was, in part, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation rather than
deferring under Chevron. Cocur Alaska, Inc. v. Sc. Alaska Conscrvation Council, 557 U.S.

295-96 (2009).
494. 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
495. Id. at 224.
496. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 24, at 307; Manning, supra note 262, at 732 (noting the
problem of self-scrving lcgislative history).

497. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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as well as judges, agencies, and interested parties who must operate under
the current legal regime.
Nevertheless, judges and interested parties need not resign themselves to
the mess created by the Supreme Court. Chevron is so indeterminate that
lower courts have plenty of room to tailor their interpretive approach to
varied facts, using contractual interpretation as a familiar guidepost. This
approach could make a real difference for agencies and interested parties.
They might find Chevron more predictable at the court of appeals level
where most cases end.
It is even possible the Supreme Court will
8
incorporate Chevron developments from lower courts.9
Contractual interpretation calls for a purposive analysis in cases where
transaction costs dominate the value of enforced terms and textual analysis
in others. For regulatory statutes, it is reasonable to assume that general
language highlights overriding transaction costs, and specific language does
not.
Thus, judges could tailor their approach by evaluating general
statutory language purposively. Such analysis would recognize that text,
dictionary definitions, and canons of constructions might not specify a
single correct answer to the policy question at hand. When faced with
more specific language, however, the same judges could place greater
emphasis on textual meaning.
This differentiated approach falls
comfortably within the existing Chevron framework-agencies have room to
interpret general statutory provisions but must adhere to specific terms
when "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."4 '4
These judges might also find common interpretive ground in the UCC's
structured purposive framework. The UCC encourages a form of modest
textualism, which prioritizes specific text, but does not allow judges to add
otherwise non-existent meaning through dictionary definitions and canons
of construction.
The UCC also provides a hierarchy of non-textual
evidence.
It suggests ways in which judges might distinguish agency
practice and reliable evidence of legislative history from unreliable evidence
of legislative history.
If started, this beneficial dialogue might even spill over to other unsettled
aspects of the Chevron framework. For example, Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
Environmental ProtectionAgeng and King v. Burwell raise important questions as
to which agency interpretations are of such great economic and political
significance that they call for less deference. As noted above, King grants
these decisions no deference, and Utility Air approaches them with a

498. Lawson & Kam, supra note 3, at 5 (describing how carly "lower court
dcyclopments" with respect to Chevron "uncasily found their way into Supreme Court
jurisprudencc").
499. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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presumption against permissibility under Chevron Step Two. Judges might
also find it helpful to tailor these holdings and develop criteria for agency
interpretations that qualify for more searching judicial review. One factor
might be whether the text of the statute is sufficiently detailed to support a
judicial determination of fixed meaning. Another factor might be whether
the case involves regulations affecting millions of people and involving
billions of dollars.500 Yet another factor might be reliance interests that call
for consistent regulatory policy.5o1
This dialogue might also address whether Step Two's "permissibility"
inquiry should turn on legal interpretation or policy judgment.5 0o2 A court's
A
invalidation of an agency's statutory interpretation is binding. 5 (o
determination that the agency's interpretation is arbitrary and capricious
would be less restrictive. It would check the agency's immediate judgment
without binding the agency to a particular policy choice in the future.504
Chevron's current problems are a choice, not an inevitability. This fact
benefits its proponents, as well as judges, agencies, and interested parties
who must operate under the Court's current regime. Contract law's semitailored compromise approach could make Chevron more predictable.
Chevron has the potential to flourish, rather than wither, over the next thirty
years.

500.

See discussion supra note 165.

501.

Id.

502.

Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1260-61 (1997) (arguing that Step Two's concerns are addressed by the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review). In Michzgan v. EPA, the Court combined
Chevron with State Fanm's arbitrary and capricious test. See 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015)
(holding that the EPA strayed beyond the "bounds of reasonable interpretation" regulation
when it failed to consider cost as an "important aspect of the problcm").
503. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Scrvs., 545 U.S. 967, 983

(2005).
504.

See supra note 429 (discussing remand in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699).

